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I ABSTRACT 
TI1e objective of this paper is to analyse whether the Maori seats in Parliament should be retained. The author sets out the 
history of the seats and then poses three questions regarding their continuing existence. First, why are Maori entitled to separate 
representation when other equaliy under-represented groups are not? Second, if Maori are entitled to special representation measures, 
are the seats providing quality representation? And third, how do the seats fit into the wider New Zealand society and impact upon the 
rights of non-Maori? 
TI1e author argues that Maori are unique in the New Zealand political environment by virtue of their status as indigenous people 
and Treaty partner to the Crown, and furthermore, that this status warrants special electoral measures. TI1ere is an increasing 
international movement to recognise the unique political rights of indigenous peoples, epitomised by the proposed Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Stronger reasons for retaining the seats can be fow1d in the Treaty partnership, and guarantees of 
rangatiratanga, taonga and the rights and privileges of British citizens. 
Maori's special status requires more than token measures, it requires meaningful representation. Despite the Royal Commission's 
concerns, the author argues that the seats now provide this under MMP. While other methods of representation in Parliament could be 
adopted, these do not have the same advantages as the seats. Alternative measures, which would increase Maori control over their own 
affairs and arguably give more weight to the Treaty partnership, such as a Maori state or separate Parliament, are unlikely to be 
implemented. 
Although the seats give Maori something more than other groups, this does not have a detrimental impact on the rights of other 
New Zealanders. The author submits that the seats are not discriminatory, nor do they w1dermine the electoral system. ln any case 
the seats can be justified in a free and democratic society under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The author concludes that 
the seats have a continuing role to play in New Zealand and should be retained 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14,883 words 
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II INTRODUCTION 
Parliament is the supreme lawmaker and has the power to impact greatly on the lives 
of all New Zealanders. As such, it is important that all New Zealand citizens can 
participate in this process through democratic Parliamentary elections. 1 In order to help 
Maori participate, special measures have been implemented. 
The Electoral Act 1993 provides for special Maori electoral districts.2 Only Maori 
can vote on the Maori roll for the seats in these districts, although they may choose to vote 
on the general roll for the general seats instead.3 The number of voters on the Maori roll 
influences the nwnber of Maori electoral districts, and consequently Maori seats.4 
Currently seven of the 120 seats in Parliament are from Maori electorates. 5 But in total 18 
Members of Parliament (MPs) identify themselves as Maori, a number roughly in 
proportion to the population.6 
While it is undeniably important that Maori be represented in Parliament, the question 
is whether they should enjoy guaranteed representation, a benefit not offered to any other 
group.7 This has been the topic of much debate over the years, and a call to abolish the 
seats has re-emerged as a political platform for the National,8 New Zealand First,9 and 
ACT 10 parties. Recently, the Electoral (Racially-Based Representation) Referendum Bill 
1 Note that there are exceptions as to who can vote. For example, voters must be over the age of eighteen 
and satisfy certain residency requirements. See the Electoral Act 1993 s 80 for disqualifications from 
registration. 
2 Electoral Act 1993 s 45. 
3 Electoral Act 1993 ss 76 - 79 outline how this option may be exercised. 
4 The number of voters on the Maori roll is divided by the quota for General electoral districts in the South 
Island to get the number of seats: Section 45(3)(a) Electoral Act 1993. 
5 Elections New Zealand: NZ Electoral system at <http://www.elections.org.nzielections/esyst/mroll.html> 
(last accessed 5 June 2003). 
6 Maori make up just under 15% of the population, equivalent to 18 seats in Parliament. See 
www.stats. govt/domi no/external/pasfu 11. nsf/web/Media+ Release+ 2001 +Census+Snapshot+4+Maori (last 
accessed 7 July 2003). 
7 RJ O' Connor "The Future of Maori Representation in Parliament" [1999) NZLJ 175, 176. 
8 Hon Bill English, Leader of the National Party "Address to the National Party Lower North Island 
Regional Conference" (National Party Lower North Island Regional Conference, Masterton, 4 May 2003). 
9 Rt Hon Winston Peters "Stealing Policies Won ' t Save Bill Says Winston" (4 May 2003) Press Release. 
'
0 Stephen Franks, ACT New Zealand Maori Affairs Spokesman, "ACT Tautoko For National's Kaupapa" 
( 4 May 2003) Press Release, 1. Stephen Franks, ACT New Zealand Maori Affairs Spokesman "Give Maori 
Credit, Labour" (5 May 2003) Press Release. 
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unsuccessfully sought referendums on Maori representation m Parliament and at local 
government level. 11 
On the other hand, there have been moves to guarantee Maori representation in other 
branches of government. For example, the Local Electoral Amendment Act 2002 allows 
regional councils to establish Maori wards for electoral purposes.
12 The Local 
Government Act 2002 provides for one of the Local Government Commission's three 
members to have knowledge of tikanga Maori, and be appointed after consultation with 
the Minister of Maori Affairs. 13 Similarly, there have been suggestions for any Supreme 
Court to include one judge versed in tikanga Maori.
14 
These trends pull in different directions and New Zealand must decide which path to 
take. This paper will examine the question of whether the seats should be abolished or 
retained. 
In order to address this issue, the history of the seats, and their original justifications 
will be set out. While initially the seats were required for effective Maori representation 
in Parliament, many of the original justifications no longer apply. Although Maori 
should not be penalised for the seats' dubious origins, the seats should not survive merely 
by default either. If they are to be kept this must be on a rational basis, and justifications 
for their continuing existence must be sought. 
A contemporary examination of the seats is required. First it must be established what 
differentiates Maori from others, and whether this wan-ants special representation 
unavailable to similarly under-represented groups. This discussion will focus on the status 
of Maori as tangata whenua, the indigenous people of New Zealand, and the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
11 See ( 4 December 2002) 604 NZPD 2519 for the Bill's defeat. 
12 Local Electoral Amendment Act 2002 s 6, inserting news l 9Z into the Local Electoral Act 200 I. 
13 Local Government Act 2002 s 33(2). See also s 14(l)(d) and s 81 which state that a Local Authority must 
provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to decision making. 
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Next the seats must be examined to see whether they are providing the required 
representation. Is there substance behind the symbolism? The Royal Commission on the 
-
Electoral System did not think the seats were meeting their goals, and this gives much 
weight to the movement to abolish them. The views of the Royal Commission will be 
analysed under the current electoral system, as will alternative proposals for 
representation. If the seats are not effective, their legitimacy is undermined and they 
become a token gesture. If this is the case, alternatives must be investigated, including 
the removal of all special measures. Arguably, even if the seats are providing effective 
representation in Parliament, this is not enough to embody a true Treaty partnership. 
Alternatives giving Maori greater decision-making powers will also be discussed. 
Finally, there will be an analysis of the seats' impact on the rest of society. Maori 
rights are important, but those must be balanced against the rights of other New 
Zealanders. A common complaint against the seats is that they discriminate against non-
Maori, and that their presence undermines the democratic integrity of our electoral 
system. These concerns must be examined and the question of whether the right balance 
has been struck between Maori and non-Maori rights determined. The seats will be 
analysed under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which is the appropriate legal 
framework for determining whether a group is privileged or disadvantaged by a certain 
measure. Maori representation must be achieved in a manner consistent with a free and 
democratic society. 
III HISTORY OF THE MAORI SEATS 
The first Parliament was established in New Zealand by the New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1852 (UK). It had six elected Provincial Councils and a General Assembly with a 
nominated Legislative Council and an elected House of Representatives. All males over 
twenty-one with a freehold estate within the electorate valued at £50 or more, a leasehold 
14 Report of the Advisory Group to the Attorney-General "Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme 
Court" (Office of the Attorney-General , Wellington, April 2002) 24. Note however that this does not 
appear in the Supreme Court Bill 2002, no 16 - 1. 
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of at least £10, or a tenement with an annt.:al rent of £10 in town or £5 in rural areas, were 
able to vote. While not directly discriminating against Maori, the effect was that most 
Maori, with their communal ownership of generally unregistered land, were unable to 
vote. 15 
In response to this situation, the Maori Representation Act 1867 provided for three 
Maori representatives in the North Island and one in the South Island. This motivation for 
the seats is illustrated in the preamble to the Act: 
WHEREAS owing to the peculiar nature of the tenure of Maori land and to other causes the native 
aboriginal inhabitants of this colony of New Zealand have heretofore with few exceptions been 
unable to become registered as electors or vote at the election of Members of the House of 
Representatives or of the provincial councils of the said colony and it is expedient for the better 
protection of the interests of Her Majesty's subjects of the native race that temporary provision 
should be made for the special representation of such of Her Majesty 's native subjects in the House 
of Representatives or of the provincial councils of the said colony. 
Protecting Maori was not the only concern, however. The Act was a useful way to 
reward Joyal Maori, placate rebels and assure Britain that it was protecting Maori rights.
16 
The seats were also conceptually linked to the demands of South Island gold diggers who 
received increased representation in a separate Act passed the same day.
17 While some 
commentators argue that there were higher princi pies involved, 
18 the end result was a 
temporary measure that left Maori substantially underrepresented.
19 
The seats were extended for a further five years in 1872, and in 1876 were extended 
indefinitely. However this was not in order to protect Maori, but rather out of fear that 
Maori would hold the balance of power in too many North Island seats if a common roll 
were established.20 It was expected that in time miscegenation and a steadily declining 
15 MPK Sorrenson "Appendix B: A History of Maori Representat ion in Parliament", B - 13 in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H3. 
16 Sorrenson, above, B - 20. 
17 Westland Representation Act 1867. 
18 See Sarah A McClelland " Maori Electoral Representation: Challenge to Orthodoxy" ( 1997) NZULR 272. 
19 The Act was only meant to stay in place for five years. Some 50 OOO Maori were given 4 seats, compared 
to 72 seats for the 250 OOO Pakeha: Sorrenson, above, B - 2 1. 
20 Sorrenson, above, B - 24 . 
7 
Maori population, combined with the rap:d increase in the European population, would 
remove this danger. 21 
There was discontent w1th separate representation and the Maori seats underwent 
various modifications to make them more consistent with the General seats,22 but it was 
not until 1986 that their future was seriously considered. A Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System (The Royal Commission) was established to investigate the options for a 
new electoral system for New Zealand, including whether to retain the Maori seats.23 
Although The Royal Commission regarded Maori representation as a positive goal for 
an electoral system, they favoured abolishing the Maori electoral option, roll and the seats. 
The Royal Conunission considered that separate Maori seats meant that non-Maori MPs 
were effectively given a license to ignore Maori.24 Furthennore, the Maori MPs were 
reliant on the majority for support, so were ineffective at representing Maori concerns.25 
The Royal Commission thought that Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system would 
be the most effective means of ensuring appropriate Maori representation in Parliament,
26 
combined with the waiver of the proposed 4% threshold for Maori parties.27 
This proposal to abolish the seats met strong Maori resistance based on the cultural 
and constitutional importance of separate Maori representation.28 As a result the seats 
were retained under MMP. 
In 2001 the MMP Review Conunittee reconsidered the issue of Maori seats, but could 
not reach unanimous agreement on the whether they should be abolished or retained, nor 
21 Sorrenson, above, B - 24. 
22 See the Electoral Amendment Act 1950 s 4 and the Electoral Act 1956 s 43 for example, which 
respectively scheduled Maori elections on the same day as General electorates, and made enrolment 
compulsory. The Electoral Amendment Act 1975 s 17 gave Maori the choice of registering on either roll. 
23 Their report can be found at Royal Commiss ion on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" 
[1986] AJHR H3 . 
24 Royal Commission, above, 91 . 
25 Royal Commission, above, 91. 
26 Recommendation 3 of the Royal Conrn1ission, above, 106. 
27 Royal Commission, above, 10 I . 
28 MMP Review Committee " Inqui ry into the Review ofMMP" [2001] AJHR I 23 A, 19. 
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whether the provisions dealing with then should be entrenched.29 In response to the 
Report, the Government maintained the status quo, noting that any changes to the voting 
system should not be lightly made, nor too frequently. 30 
IV SYMBOLISM: THE SPECIAL STATUS OF MAORI 
While changes to the electoral system should not be made lightly, uruneritorious 
measures should not be maintained by default either. Many of the original justifications 
for the seats, such as the property qualification preventing Maori registration, or special 
representation for gold diggers, have Jong since ended. However, just because the 
original reasons for their existence no longer apply does not mean that the seats should be 
discontinued. But if they are to remain, contemporary justifications must be found. 
The first question to address when considering the maintenance of the status quo is 
whether Maori are entitled to special representation. There are other groups in society 
who are similarly under-represented in Parliament and yet do not receive the same 
benefits. 31 Two bases for differentiating Maori, notably their status as tangata whenua, 
and the Treaty of Waitangi, will be examined to see whether these justify special 
representation. If they do not, the seats' legitimacy is undermined. 
A Indigenous Rights 
Despite some similarities with other under-represented groups in Parliament, Maori 
are unique as the indigenous people of New Zealand. In the words of academic 
commentator Andrew Sharp:32 
Maori have insisted they are not just another ethnic group ... They are tangata whenua, 'children of the 
land ', intimately connected with the place in a way far deeper than any Pakeha could be, or any other 
29 MMP Review Committee, above, 19 - 27. 
30 Ministry of Justice "Government Response to Report of MM P Review Committee on Inquiry into the 
Review ofMMP" [2001] AJHR AS, 5. 
31 For example, with only 35 female MPs out of 120, women are not represented in Parliament 
proportionate to the wider population 
32 Andrew Sharp "Blood, Custom and Consent: Three Kinds of Maori Groups and the Challenge They 
Present to Governments" (2002) 52 UTLJ 9, I O - l l . 
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recent immigrant. Other peoples can go home; Maori have nowhere else to go. As original inhabitants 
too - as an 'indigenous' people - they have special claims against Pakeha and their state. 
This indigenous status may give Maori a unique claim to guaranteed representation.33 
Maori were here first and · were exercising sovereignty, which was then acquired by 
Britain in dubious circumstances.34 Maori argue that their rights to participate in 
decision-making should continue, post cession of sovereignty, because of this, and that 
they should be recognised by the Government as equals.35 
Indigenity alone has not yet been recognised as a basis for political rights in New 
Zealand, but there is increasing international awareness of the rights of indigenous people, 
and over time the position may change. At the United Nations a Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) has been established,36 and has produced a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Draft) for adoption and proclamation 
by the General Assembly.37 The Draft is currently before the Commission on Human 
Rights where an open-ended inter-sessional working group (the Working Group) is 
considering it.38 
Unlike other international documents, the Draft Declaration would clearly apply to all 
indigenous peoples. 39 WGIP has declined to define the term "indigenous", and prefers 
33 Trevor Knight "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada" (2001) 46 McGill LJ I 063, I 091. 
34 The Maori understanding of the Treaty has been cha I Jenged on the basis of bad translations and 
inadequate explanations. lt must also be noted that not all Chiefs signed the Maori version, and that some of 
those that did sought to revoke their signature soon after. For a history of the Treaty and the circumstances 
surrounding it see Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (A llen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, 
Wellington, 1987). 
35 Andrew Sharp "Blood, Custom and Consent: Three Kinds of Maori Groups and the Challenge They 
Present to Governments" (2002) 52 UTLJ 9, I O - 11 . 
36 ECOSOC Resolution 1982/3 4 (7 May 1982). 
37 The final text as agreed upon by WGI Pat its eleventh session can be found at 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex I 23 August 1993. 
38 Sarah Pritchard "Working Group on Indigenous Populations: mandate, standard-setting activities and 
future perspectives" in Sarah Pritchard ( ed) Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (The 
Federation Press, Annandale (NSW), 1990) 50. 
39 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (12 ovember 1968) 999 UNTS 
272 gives rights, such as self-determination, which indigenous people seek. However, it is not clear whether 
this applies to indigenous peoples or not as the Human Ri ghts Committee has refused to determine whether 
they can claim this right as it is outside the Covenant's individual complaint mechanism: Lubicon Lake 
Band v Canada, Communication No 167 /1984, UN Doc CCPR/C/41 / 0/167/ 1984 ( 1990), paras 13.3 and 
32.1. Of course, the same issue as to whether indigenous people are a "people" qualifying for self-
detern1ination is proving contentious in deliberations regarding the Draft Declaration. 
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indigenous peoples to define themselves.40 However, a commonly used definition is that 
of the Special Raporteur Martinez Cobo, wruch includes both subjective and objective 
elements:41 
lndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with 
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories ... They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to 
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal 
systems. 
Maori fit trus definition as they were here before European colonisation, consider 
themselves distinct from Pakeha and, as the Treaty claims process shows, they have made 
great efforts to reclaim their culture, their language and their lands and resources to pass 
on to other generations. Even if Maori were not the very first people here, there is still 
good reason to treat them as indigenous.42 Within any criterion Maori fit the term. 43 
As an indigenous people, Article 4 of the proposed Draft Declaration would recognise 
that Maori have the right to participate fully in the political life of the State. The proposed 
Article 19 further provides that Maori should be entitled to: 
participate fully if they so choose, at all levels of decision making in matters which may affect their 
rights, lives and destinies through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their 
own procedures , as well as to maintain and develop their own decision-making institutions. 
Some State Parties to the Declaration have expressed concern that as currently drafted, 
Article 19 gives an unconditional right of participation, and that conflicting interpretations 
40 UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/ 1982/33, para 42 . See also Article 8 of the Draft Declaration which recognises the 
right of indigenous populations to identify themselves as indigenous. 
41 As cited in Sarah Pritchard "Working Group on Indigenous Populations: mandate, standard-setting 
activities and future perspectives" in Sarah Pritchard ( ed) indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and 
Human Rights (The Federation Press, Annandale NSW, 1990) 43 . 
42 F M Brookfield Waitangi and indigenous Rights: Revolution, law and l egitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999) 78, 80 - 81. Note however that FM Brookfield suggests that where an 
indigenous people recognises principles of conquest and seizure of power in their own customs (for example 
when Maori colonised the Chatham lslands) then this undermines to some extent their claims to continuing 
sovereignty when colonised themselves. 
43 Jan Brownlie Treaties and indigenous Peoples: The Robb l ectures 1991 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 
55. 
II 
are possible.
44 
While State Parties may prefer an interpretation where lesser forms of 
participation, such as consultation, could be enough, the proposed Draft requires fidl 
participation through representatives chosen by the indigenous groups themselves. 
If implemented, Article 4 would protect the seats. As will be discussed in Part V, the 
seats ensure Maori have a direct say in what decisions are made in Parliament, the highest 
level decision-making body in New Zealand. Furthermore, MPs for the Maori seats are 
elected exclusively by Maori, and so reflect their own values and concerns. That the seats 
are an appropriate method of Maori participation, is shown by their strong Maori 
45 support. 
It is important to remember that the Draft Declaration has yet to be put to the United 
Nations General Assembly and so as yet gives no protection to the seats. The progress on 
the Draft Declaration is slow,46 and it is predicted that significant changes will be made 
before it is put to the General Assembly.47 It is difficult to imagine how New Zealand, 
among other key nations, would come to sign the Draft Declaration as currently 
forrnulated. 48 To do so could well create a host of internal legal challenges, increase non-
indigenous anxiety and result in political turmoil. 49 
44 See the comments of Norway and Chile respectively in ATSIC international indigenous Issues: An 
Analysis of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( 1999) at 
http://www.atsic.gov.au/Jssues/indigenous rights/ international/draft declaration/drafl dee six live.asp (last 
accessed 19 August 2003 ). 
45This support can be seen in the large number of Maori choosing the Maori roll. 14 OOO Maori voters 
moved from the General roll to the Maori roll at the last electoral option, and over 15 OOO of the 18 500 
Maori registering for the first time signed on to the Maori roll: "Parliament's Maori Seat anachronism" (24 
January 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington, 4. 
46 In its first four years of discussion, the Commission adopted only two Articles. Heather S Archer "Effect 
of United Nations Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights on Current Policies of Member States" (1999) 5 
J Intl Legal Stud 205, 208. 
47 Archer, above, 213. 
48 For example, currently Article 3 of the Draft Declaration would give indigenous people the right to self 
determination, which in a broad form may give a right to secede from the State. Ken S Coates 
"International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and PG McHugh Living 
Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1998) 19, 39. 
49 Coates, above, 39. 
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Even if adopted by the General Asse1nbly in substantially the same form as WGIP 
reconunended, the seats might not be effectively protected by the Declaration. It will be a 
declaratory statement with only moral force and will require State ratification.50 Once 
ratified, the Declaration has no guidelines or specific directions as to what is required and 
States can determine what is required themselves, and do nothing or only effect minimal 
changes.51 Nor is there any complaint mechanism included.52 Indigenous groups regard 
the Declaration as being too flexible in this regard. 53 
Therefore while Maori status as tangata whenua is part of the context for special 
recognition, it does not currently give substantive rights. Other justifications must be 
sought out. 
B The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 
Maori are also umque m their status as Treaty partner to the Crown. As a 
constitutional document of great importance,54 the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (the Treaty) 
gives Maori a stronger claim to special representation than the Draft Declaration. There is 
an established jurisprudence regarding Treaty rights, and a political sentiment that New 
Zealand should aim to recognise the special relationship created by this document, and 
honour the guarantees contained therein. 
50 Heather S Archer "Effect of United nations Draft Decl aration on Indigenous Rights on Current Policies of 
Member States" ( 1999) 5 J Intl Legal Stud 205, 219. 
51 Archer, above, 239. 
52 Even if such a mechanism were included, there could still be difficulties enforcing decisions made under 
it. For example, although the Human Rights Committee considers its views to be binding (JS Davidson 
" Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights Committee" (200 1) NZ 
Law Rev 125, 142), the majority of the Court of Appeal has considered they are not binding on New 
Zealand, although they do have moral force: Wellington District Legal Services Commillee v Tangiora 
[ 1998] 1 NZLR 129 (CA), per Keith J for the Court. On appea l, the Judicial Committee preferred not to 
conclude on this aspect. While they accepted that the views were not binding, and that the State party is free 
to criticise or refuse to implement them, the Committee nonetheless sympathised with Thomas J in the CA 
(dissent) that its functions are adjudicative: Tangiora v Wellington District Legal Services [2000] 1 NZLR 
17, 21 (PC) per Lord Millet. 
53 Archer, above, 238. 
54 New Zealand Maori Council v Allorney-General [ 1996] 3 NZLR 140, 184 - 185 (CA) per Thomas J 
(dissenting); New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-Genera/ [ 1994] I NZLR 513, 516 (PC) per Lord 
Woolf. 
13 
Although the Electoral Act does not s~ow the Treaty's significance in this area by 
direct reference, the Treaty is of general application and colours all matters to which it has 
relevance. 55 Whether the general relationship created by the Treaty, and the guarantees 
under Articles II and III, are relevant to the seats will now be examined. If so, this gives 
weight to the Maori claim for special representation. 
1 Relationship between Maori and the Crown 
In New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney -Genera/56 Cooke P described the Treaty as 
a "partnership between races" .57 This partnership was about creating one nation where 
Maori and Pakeha could peacefully coexist as equals. 
Some argue that the partnership does not protect the seats, in fact it is a reason to 
abolish them. According to this view, because the seats give Maori something that others 
do not get, they foster separatism and undermine the Treaty partnership. 58 A partnership 
requires Maori to get the same rights, not more. 
However, the goal of the seats is not separatist. Instead they aim to give Maori a 
proper place in the decision making process so that they can enjoy the same benefits as 
Pakeha. President Cooke was very clear in the Maori Council Case that a partnership 
does not require Maori to be assimilated, but that they can retain their unique 
characteristics and rights within this relationship.59 The seats try to ensure that New 
Zealand law and policy does not ignore the Maori Treaty partner by assuming they have 
the same needs as other New Zealanders. 
The partnership relationship creates responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties. The 
Crown has to actively protect Maori interests, to the fullest extent reasonably 
55 Barton-Prescott v Director-General Social Welfare [ 1997] 3 NZLR 179, 184 (HC) per Gallen and 
Goddard JJ. 
56 (1987] I NZLR641. 
57 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 , 664 (CA). 
58 See for example the ACT Party submiss ions to the MMP Review Committee: MMP Review Committee 
"Inquiry into the Review of MMP"(2001] AJHR I 23 A, 21. 
59 New Zealand Maori Council [1987] , above, 664. 
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practicable.60 Abolishing the Maori seats i., only in line with protection of Maori interests 
if Maori are able to participate properly in decision making without them,61 or they are 
replaced with a more suitable method for Maori input.62 At the very least, as a Treaty 
partner, Maori should be consulted before the seats are abolished. 
It is important to note that as a product of statute, the seats would require legislation to 
remove them. If removed contrary to Crown policy, arguably there would be no breach 
by a Treaty partner. The Treaty was signed by over 500 Maori Chiefs and representatives 
of the British Crown, whose responsibility now resides with the Crown in right of New 
Zealand.63 The "Crown" is a nebulous concept, but in its constitutional role it can be 
considered the embodiment of executive government. 64 The Crown is not Parliament. 
However, while MMP has certainly made legislative policy more contestable, 
especially where there is a minority Government or policy differences between coalition 
parties,65 it is unlikely that the seats would be removed against Crown wishes. The 
Government still controls the legislative programme as it initiates most legislation and 
determines the position of bills on the Order Paper. As such, the Crown still retains much 
control over what happens in Parliament. 
Furthennore, some commentators now suggest that a constitutional convention 1s 
developing whereby the New Zealand Parliament may not legislate contrary to the Treaty 
principles, 66 despite the orthodox position that the Treaty does not limit Parliament's 
60 New Zealand Maori Council [1987], above, 664, per Cooke P. 
61 See Part VB( I) below, which argues that this is not currently possible. 
62 For example, the New Zealand Maori Council has recommended a Senate (ten Maori, ten non-Maori) and 
two legislative bodies, a chamber of Maori representatives (fifteen members) and a general chamber (eighty 
five members): M H Durie "The Treaty of Waitangi : Perspectives for Social Policy" in I 1-1 Kawharu (ed) 
Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1989) 280, 297. See Part VB(2) and (3): Other Alternatives for a further discussion. 
63 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1994] , I NZLR 513, 517 (PC) per Lord Woolf. The 
existence of the Crown in right of New Zealand is confirmed by the Constitution Act 1986, s 2. 
64 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington , 
2001) 548. 
65 Joseph, above, 318. 
66 Blades "Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Case Study on 
Implementation in New Zealand" [ l 994] I CNLR I, 32 fn 197. 
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sovereignty. In any case, the Courts will n0t lightly ascribe to Parliament an intention to 
breach Treaty principles and will try to interpret legislation consistently.
67 
2 Specific guarantees under the Treaty 
Aside from creating an on-going relationship between the Crown and Maori, the 
Treaty also made certain guarantees to Maori, which should be upheld. Whether separate 
political representation is necessary to fulfil these promises must be examined. 
(a) Sovereignty, kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga 
The Maori and English versions of the Treaty are not exact translations of one another. 
This gives rise to arguments over what was actually ceded by Maori. Most of the 500 
Chiefs signed the Maori version, under Article II of which Maori retained tino 
rangatiratanga over their taonga. 
68 Te tino rangatiratanga can be translated as full 
authority.69 Combined with the cession of kawanatanga in Article I, meaning 
govemance,70 this leaves open the argument that Maori thought they were ceding 
something less than sovereign power. 
While arguments for a reassertion of Maori sovereign power may be attractive,7
1 it 
must be recognised that both versions gave some legitimacy to the British presence, and to 
See also the Legislative Advisory Committee Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and 
Content (2001, Wellington) chapter 5 which states that all legislation is expected to comply with the Treaty; 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Cabinet Office Manual para 5.35 at 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/manual/5.html (last accessed 19 August 2003) where it states that 
Ministers must draw Cabinet's attention to any implications concerning Treaty principles when bids are 
made to include bills in the legislative programme. 
67 New Zealand Maori Council vAttorney-Genera! [1996] 3 NZLR 140, 160 (CA). 
68 Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1987) I, 
41. 
69 "Full authority" is the translation preferred by the Waitangi Tribunal. See Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua 
Fishing Claim: Wai 22 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1987) 174. 
70 MPK Sorrenson "Appendix B: A History of Maori Representation in Parliament", 8- JO in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986) AJHR H3. See also I H 
Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1989), 319 
71 For example, at international law the doctrine of contra proferentem states that ambiguities or 
uncertainties in the Treaty should be resolved against the Crown as the party which drafted it and put it 
forward. This would mean disputes over cession of sovereignty should be resolved in favour of Maori. 
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the exercise of Crown authority in New ~ealand. 72 The English vers10n of Article II 
makes it clear that sovereignty was ceded to Britain. It is generally accepted that this 
happened, partly through discovery, partly through cession, partly through occupation and 
partly by assertion.73 The Courts accept Parliament's sovereignty.
74 
The British had a very precise understanding of what "sovereignty" meant. In the 
words of Paul McHugh: 75 
It was the power to make and enforce commands which, in turn, issue from a political superior, 
knowing subjection to no other body. It is thus a power of independent lawmaking and 
enforce111ent. English law has long recogni[s]ed that the sovereignty of the Crown over its territory 
is exclusive and exhaustive ... The Crown's title to its territory is indivisible - it shares the 
sovereignty with no one. 
It is important to emphasise that in New Zealand the Crown's sovereignty is seen to be 
exclusive, with no room for rangatiratanga as a separate source of sovereign power.
76 
While Maori, in effect, continued governing themselves in some areas, and their customs 
continued after 1840, under British constitutional theory this occurs with the presumptive 
permission of the Crown rather than as an exercise of independent and continuing 
. 77 
sovereignty. 
But accepting British sovereignty does not mean Maori lost all rights - even a literal 
reading of the English version gives them some control. Rangatiratanga could be seen as 
However, that the Court of Appeal has interpreted both versions together, rather than one taking precedence 
over the other: New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-Genera/ [ 1987] l NZLR 641. 
72 FM Brookfield "The New Zealand Constitution - the Search for Legitimacy" in I H Kawharu (ed) 
Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1989)1,5. 
73 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) 38. 
74 See So111ers J in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1987] 1 NZLR 641, 690 where he 
states that "I a111 of the opinion that the question of sovereignty in New Zealand is not in doubt ... 
Sovereignty resides in Parlia111ent". No other 111ember of the Court dissented on this point. 
See also Manukau v Attorney-General [2000] NZAR 621 (HC) where the Executive Council of the 
Hereditary Sovereign Confederation of United Tribes of Nu Tireni ( ew Zealand) challenged Parliamentary 
sovereignty, but the claim was struck out as so untenable that it could not succeed. 
75 PG McHugh "Constitutional Theory and Maori Clai111s" in I H Kawharu (ed)Waitangi: Maori and 
Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 25, 37. 
76 
McHugh, above, 39. 
77 McHugh, above, 40. 
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entitling Maori to a measure of autonomy y;ithin New Zealand. 78 This would recognise 
the power of Maori to control and define their individual and collective identities. 79 
Whether the seats fulfil this definition of rangatiratanga is debatable. The seats 
necessarily function within a non-Maori institution, where Maori are a minority and are 
subject to non-Maori ideals and demands. As such they could be considered too weak a 
fonn of participation to qualify as rangatiratanga. 
Nevertheless, the Waitangi Tribunal has accepted that the seats could be seen as an 
expression of autonomy within the New Zealand State, and has suggested that they could 
be the closest form of rangatiratanga currently available to Maori.80 The seats give Maori 
some say on laws and policy that will impact on Maori cultural, economic and social 
wellbeing. Rather than having decisions made for them, Maori can play an active part in 
the process. As such, they allow Maori to exercise a limited amount of control over their 
collective destiny by guaranteeing them a place in the Legislature. Furthermore, the seats 
recognise that Maori did have some prior sovereign rights and that while no longer 
sovereign, have a special interest in the way the country is run. 
(b) Taonga 
Even if it is not accepted that rangatiratanga embodies autonomous rights, or that the 
seats express this, a limited reading based on the English version of the Treaty includes in 
rangatiratanga the right to "full exclusive and undisturbed possession" of taonga. Taonga 
means "things that are highly valued", and is a wider concept than the English version, 
including both tangible and intangible things,81 and could potentially encompass the seats. 
If the seats are taonga, they must be actively protected. 
78 The Waitangi Tribunal Maori Electoral Option Report: Wai 413 (Brookers Wellington, 1994) 4. 
79 Patrick Mackhelm "First Nations Self Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" 
(1991) 36 McGill LJ 382,387. 
80 The Tribunal did not express an opinion on whether they were an expression of rangatiratanga, as this was 
only brought up in the claimant's closing address: Waitangi Tribunal Wai 413, above, 4, 14. 
81 Waitangi Tribunal Manukau Claim Report: Wai 8 (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 70. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal has required <1. high evidentiary onus to be met before 
something is found to be a taonga. A tradition of longstanding is not enough.82 As the 
seats were created post 1840 by non-Maori, and continue to function according to non-
Maori rules in a non-Maori environment where Maori are a minority, it is questionable 
whether they qualify as taonga. 
On the other hand, although originally a Pakeha creation, the seats have been 
indigenised. 83 The traits valued in Maori MPs are not necessarily the same as for those in 
General seats, and Maori MPs are subject to different expectations. 84 For example, they 
must be competent on the Marae and knowledgeable about tikanga Maori. The seats are 
highly prized within Maoridom and have taken on a cultural significance far beyond that 
envisaged in 1867. The huge amount of support for the seats can be seen in the uproar 
created by attempts to abolish them under the new Electoral Act,85 the increasing number 
of Maori enrolled on the Maori roll,86 and the great standing and honour of the Maori MPs 
within the Maori community.87 
Although the Waitangi Tribunal ultimately left open the possibility that the seats were 
taonga, it stated in the Maori Electoral Option Report that: 88 
the right of political representation in the form of four Parliamentary seats reserved to Maori has 
long been a highly valued right and expression ofrangatiratanga, as is the Maori language. 
The right of political representation has now been enhanced by the Electoral Act 1993 and the 
evidence before us strongly suggests that the present rights are highly prized. 
Further arguments for their recognition as taonga can be made by analogy. In the Te 
Rea Maori Report, the Waitangi Tribunal held that language was a taonga. They came to 
this conclusion on the basis that language was an essential part of the culture, and was 
82 See Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report: Wai 796 (Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2003) 42 - 44. 
83 MPK Sorrenson "Appendix B: A History of Maori Representation in Parliament", B - 57 in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986] AJHR H3 . 
84 
Sorrenson, above, B - 57. 
85 The opposition is recorded at MMP Review Committee "Inquiry into the Review of MMP" [2001] AJHR 
123A, 19. 
86 The increasing number of Maori on the Maori roll has allowed the number of seats to rise from four to 
seven over the last two electoral options. 
87The mana of the MPs is described in Nick Venter "Horomia: On the Marae He's The Man" (14 July 2003) 
The Dominion Post Wellington, 2. 
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highly prized among Maori as the very rlaim itself and the widespread support in 
Maoridom showed.89 Furthermore, the right to use Maori language would have been one 
of the rights the Chiefs would have expected to be covered by the Treaty.90 
Applying this to the Maori seats, political power was an essential part of the Maori 
culture. Prior to European colonisation Maori had well-established tribal governance 
structures and lived in a highly political atmosphere. 91 If the Chiefs had realised they 
would lose their mana, they would not have signed the Treaty.92 The seats are the 
contemporary realisation of this rangatiratanga, and are taonga, which must be protected. 
The Treaty is a living document, and its guarantees must be applied in light of modern 
circumstances, not limited to 1840.93 
Even if the seats are not themselves taonga, arguably they are necessary to protect 
other established taonga such as lands, fisheries, and language. While it was accepted in 
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-Generaf4 that the Crown is not obliged to go 
beyond taking action that is reasonable in the prevailing circumstances when protecting 
taonga, the Maori seats are a reasonable means of doing so. Other ways for Maori to 
protect taonga, such as having their interests taken into account under the Resource 
Management Act,95 or through consultation,96 only go some of the way. Parliament is the 
supreme lawmaker, and thus has ultimate control over what happens to these resources. 
Recent examples, such as the announcements that legislation will be passed to deny 
88 Waitangi Tribunal The Maori Electoral Option Report: Wai 413 (Brookers, Wellington, 1994) 33. 
89 Waitangi Tribunal Te Reo Maori Report: Wai 11 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1986) 20. 
90 Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 11, above, 22. 
91 MPK Sorrenson "Appendix B: A History of Maori Representation in Parliament", 8-6 in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJJ-IR J-13. 
92 R J Walker "The Treaty of Waitangi as the Focus of Maori Protest" in I H Kawharu ( ed) Waitangi: Maori 
and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 263,266. 
93 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v Allorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641,650 (CA) per Cooke P for the Court. 
94 [1994] I NZLR513,517(PC). 
95 Resource Management Act 1991 s 6( e) provides that the relationship of Maori and their culture and 
traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, wahi tapu, and other taonga must be taken into account 
when exercising the functions and powers under the Act. 
96 In Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-Genera/ of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553, 560 (CA) 
Cooke P for the Court recognised that rights of consultation are not enough to protect taonga. 
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purported Maori ownership over the foreshore,
97 or prevent compensation for lost oil 
rights on their land,98 demonstrate that the Legislature has the power to impinge on Maori 
property rights, and is willing to use it. As such, it is imperative that Maori have at least 
some active part in making those decisions. 
(c) Rights and Privileges of British Citizens 
Article III of the Treaty gave Maori all the "Rights and Privileges of British Subjects", 
but this does not necessarily advance the case for separate representation. It could be 
argued that Article III only guarantees Maori the same rights as British citizens and so 
does not cover special measures such as the Maori seats. Maori are entitled to political 
representation, but only when exercised in the same manner as for all other citizens. 
This is not an attractive argument. The Waitangi Tribunal considered that the 
extension to Maori under Article III of these rights and privileges necessarily included the 
right of political representation.
99 The Tribunal even went so far as to say that it was 
difficult to imagine a more important or fundamental right.
100 The rights and privileges of 
British citizens were given as consideration for the substantial concessions made by Maori 
under the first two Articles, 
101 and as such must be meaningful rights. The Crown has 
vigorously enforced its side of the Treaty bargain, and Maori should get the benefit of the 
guarantees made to them. Sometimes in order to enjoy the equality of rights and 
privileges, special measures are needed. If the seats are needed in order for Maori to 
enjoy effective representation, as will be examined in the next Part, then they must be 
retained. 
V SUBSTANCE: QUALITY REPRESENTATION? 
97 The legislation will deem the seabed and foreshore to be in the public domain rather than use ownership 
concepts. Some Maori MPs such as Parekura Horomia have supported the move, others such as Tariana 
Turia are less accepting. See Nick Venter and Gordon Jon Thompson "Beaches for all: Angry Maori 
groups warn of protest" (19 August 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington A I. 
98 See "Clark rejects Maori oil claims" (20 May 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington, I. 
99 Waitangi Tribunal Maori Electoral Option Report: Wai 413 (Brookers, Wellington , 1994) 12. 
100 Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 413, above, 12. 
101 Waitangi Tribunal , Wai 413, above, 13 . 
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A The Maori Seats 
Indigenous status and Treaty rights provide theoretical justifications for separate 
representation, _but to create a true Treaty partnership there must be substance behind the 
theory. For adequate protection of taonga, or true enjoyment of the same rights as British 
citizens, the Treaty requires meaningful participation and active protection of Maori 
rights. If the seats are not providing this, they must either be reworked or removed. As 
opponents of the seats place much importance on the fact that the Royal Commission 
recommended abolishing the seats, it is necessary to examine the reasoning behind those 
recommendations. 
I The Royal Commission 's recommendations 
The Royal Commission believed that Maori should be represented in the House, but 
that it must be done in an effective manner. To test whether the seats provided the 
required quality ofrepresentation, the Commission set out five principles, constituting: 102 
the conditions under which an important minority might reasonably expect to enjoy a just and 
equitable share of political power and influence in a decision-making system which is subject to the 
majority principle and over which the political parties hold sway. 
These principles are that: 103 
• Maori interests should be represented in Parliament by Maori MPs 
• Maori electors ought to have an effective vote competed for by all political parties 
• All MPs should be accountable in some degree to Maori electors 
• Maori MPs ought to be democratically accountable to Maori electors 
• Candidate selection procedures of the political parties should be organised in such a 
way as to pem1it the Maori people a voice in the decision of who the candidates are to 
be. 
The principal disadvantage of the seats in light of these objectives was that, 
traditionally, the seats allowed non-Maori MPs, the majority in the House, to ignore 
102 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986] AJHR H3, 87. 
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Maori concerns. 104 Even in areas where Maori held large numbers, they were not using 
their voting power to bring about greater responsiveness to Maori concerns.
105 Because 
the seats were for all intents and purposes viewed as Labour seats, there was no incentive 
for any political party to campaign vigorously for them by offering policies better suited 
to Maori concerns. 106 
Historically, the effectiveness of Maori MPs was not a matter of what they could 
achieve, but of how much they were allowed to achieve.
107 There were very few periods 
when a Maori MP held the position of Minister of Maori Affairs and so there was little 
chance for Maori to initiate policy. 
M - . I I . r: 10s aon was arge y unsatls1actory. 
The overall record of Parliament in dealing with 
Further difficulties were found in the large demographic size of the electorates, which 
made adequate service impossible and hindered the development of grass roots parties.
109 
The fixed number of seats was also felt by Maori to be unjust, and provided little 
incentive for registration on the Maori roll. 
Overall, the Royal Commission considered that the seats fell far short of ensuring an 
effective vote for Maori electors or in holding all MPs accountable to Maori. As such the 
seats made it extremely difficult for Maori MPs to protect and promote Maori concerns.
110 
The Royal Commission concluded that the electoral system should be changed to 
MMP, and that this would enable better representation for Maori without the need for the 
seats. 111 A common roll under an appropriate electoral system would: 
112 
103 Royal Commission, above, 88. 
104 Royal Commission, above, 90. 
105 Royal Commission, above, 91. 
106 Royal Commission, above, 92. 
107 Royal Commission, above, 92. 
108 Royal Commission, above, 90. 
109 Royal Commission, above, 94 - 95. 
110 Royal Commission, above, 97 - 98. 
111 Recommendation 3: Royal Commission, above, I 06. 
112 Royal Commission, above, 98. 
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provide Maori electors with a more effective vote and with the assurance that all MPs and not just 
Maori MPs were in some degree acwuntable to Maori electors. As a result, all MPs would be 
forced to compete for Maori votes at election time, and the political parties would therefore be 
under some pressure to give greater attention to Maori interests and concerns in the development of 
policy and to pursue those interests more vigorously while in office. They would also be under 
some pressure to offer Maori as candidates, to service Maori constituents in ways that met their 
expectations, and to target Maori electors in their canvassing and other electioneering processes. 
2 Effectiveness of the seats under MMP 
While the views of the Royal Commission carry great weight, they must be viewed in 
context. 113 Importantly the recommendations were made under a First-Past-the-Post 
(FPP) electoral system. They now require re-examination in light of the change in 1993 to 
a Mixed-Member-Proportional (MMP) electoral system. 
The most obvious change is that under MMP the number of MPs who identify 
themselves as Maori has increased. While this is a good sign, merely increasing the 
numbers does not ensure better quality of representation. The real question is whether 
Maori concerns are being properly protected and promoted in the House. The 
disadvantages of the seats identified by the Royal Commission have been lessened by the 
change in electoral system. 114 Although general constituency MPs may still feel Jess 
accountable to Maori than to their largely non-Maori constituents, there are now also list 
MPs, for whom Maori and non-Maori vote in exactly the same way. As Maori make up 
twelve percent of the emolled voting population, no political party can afford to ignore 
their concems. 115 A reflection of this newly found Maori political power, is the fact that 
political parties are increasingly fielding Maori candidates in general constituency and list 
seats. 116 
Although, currently, all seven Maori MPs are Labour MPs, the 1996 election saw New 
Zealand First take a clean sweep of the seats. This was seen as an indication that Maori 
113 See Claudia Geiringer "Reading English in Context" [2003) ZLJ 23 9. 
11 4 Geiringer, above, 241 . 
11 5 Geiringer, above, 241 . 
116 Geiringer, above, 241 . 
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were preparing to set out in new directions. 11
7 It has provided incentive for political 
parties to campaign for the seats, although it can be questioned just how compatible such a 
campaign would be with the current policy of the Right that they should be abolished. 
Regardless of this increased accountability of political parties and general MPs to 
Maori, the guaranteed Maori seats are still required. A Maori MP standing outside the 
Maori seats cannot necessarily promote Maori interests effectively and might not be able 
to give adequate representation. 118 It is important that Maori have representatives to voice 
their perspective and to reflect their needs in the policy process.
119 As stated in the 
appendix to the Royal Commission's report: 
120 
Those who chose to stay on the rolls of the Maori seats are participating in a unique and valuable 
sub-system. Here electors can chooses representatives of their own culture who can express their 
constituents' attitudes, views and responses, articulate their needs, and attend to their contacts with 
Departments and officialdom and mediate one to the other. No MP in a General electorate could 
consistently perform such a task, for he or she is tied in terms of time and is responsible for 
expressing the interests and considering the views of constituents predominantly or 
overwhelmingly of another culture. 
Even though the Maori MPs do not have the numbers to stop legislation they can at 
least make sure the Maori viewpoint is heard and considered. The Maori MPs have been 
successful in transforming Maori activism into politically acceptable programmes and 
have been able to alert the Labour Party to relevant issues and trends within Maoridom 
that would have otherwise escaped notice.
121 Furthermore, recent events have shown that 
Maori MPs are becoming more willing to flex their political muscle. While Maori MPs 
are in the minority in Parliament, they can still be effective in highlighting Maori 
concerns. 122 
117 Jonathon Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, Nigel S Roberts New Zealand Under MMP: A 
New Politics? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996) 71. 
118 M H Durie "The Treaty of Waitangi: Perspectives for Social Policy" in 1 H Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: 
Maori and Piikehii Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 280, 
296. 
119 Trevor Knight "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada" (2001) 46 McGill LJ 1063 I 068. 
120 Robert Chapman "Annex Voting in the Maori Political Sub-System 1935 - 1984", 8-107 in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H3. 
121 Augie Fleras, as cited in Knight, above, I 079. 
122 See for example the statements made by the Maori MPs when Labour announced it would be legislating 
against Maori customary title over the foreshore, or that it would not recognise Maori title to oil: Nick 
Venter "Revolt by Maori MPs over foreshore" (25 June 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington, I; Tracy 
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We must be careful not to judge Maori MPs by Pakeha standards such as performance 
in debate. 123 The qualities for leadership in Maori are different, and at times incompatible 
with those in -the Pakeha comrnunity. 124 The Maori MPs are expected to be equally 
proficient on the Marae as in Parliament, no mean feat. 125 Furthermore, Maori generally 
suffer more socially and economically than non-Maori and this brings particular 
challenges to the Maori MPs when serving their electorates. 
Some of the administrative difficulties caused by such large electorates will have been 
lessened by the fact that the Maori seats are now proportionate to the Maori roll. As more 
Maori register on the roll, there will be more Maori seats, and thus a corresponding 
diminution in the geographical size of the electorate. This will enable Maori MPs to 
better service their constituents. However, since the Maori electorates remain much 
larger than those of General electorates, this is still a problem, but not, in itself, a reason 
for abolishing the seats. 
It is also important to remember that, while not ultimately recommending the retention 
of the seats, the Royal Commission's found that the seats had considerable advantages 
over other systems of representation. Importantly, the seats guaranteed Maori a place in 
the national forum where their voices could be heard on matters important to them. The 
seats ensured Maori issues could be kept before Parliament regardless of non-Maori 
attitudes, or the number of Maori. Furthermore, the Maori MPs were directly accountable 
to Maori. 126 
Watkins and Ruth Berry "Turia Breaks Ranks on Oil Claim" (21 May 2003)The Dominion Post 
Wellington, I. 
123 MPK Sorrenson "Appendi x B: A History of Maori Representation in Parliament", B - 56 in Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [l 986] AJHR H3. See also Nick 
Venter "Horomia: On the Marae He 's The Man" ( 14 July 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington, 2. 
Parekura Horomia been recently ridiculed in House, but on Marae is supported wholeheartedly by Maori. 
124 See Raj Vasil What do the Maori Want ? New Maori Political Perspectives (Random Century, Auckland, 
1990) 73 - 83. 
125 Sorrenson, above, B - 57. 
126 Royal Commission on the E lectoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H3, 89. 
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Maori MPs did, of course, have party obligations too, but had to be accountable for 
their party policies to Maori. The Maori MPs could provide an effective channel for 
explaining the policies to their constituents and for taking Maori responses back to the 
rty 127 pa . 
The Royal Commission noted that the system had been adapted to function in Maori 
ways.1 2s The Maori seats meant that MPs representing Maori were appropriate 
spokespeople. Almost all candidates for the seats were fluent in Maori, competent on the 
Marae, strongly committed to the preservation of Maori cultural identity, and had 
experience in dealing with Maori cultural issues. 129 As such, they could understand 
Maori, and represent them in Parliament in ways that non-Maori could not. These 
qualities meant Maori MPs carried personal and tribal mana. 
Under MMP the advantages identified by the Royal Commission still hold true. Maori 
MPs in the Maori seats remain directly accountable to their Maori constituents, and 
provide Maori with a guaranteed voice in Parliament. The MPs themselves continue to be 
appropriate representatives for the Maori people. Thus while the disadvantages of the 
seats found by the Royal Commission have diminished under MMP, their advantages have 
remained. When viewed according to the Royal Commission's criteria in a contemporary 
context, the seats provide effective representation, as required under the Treaty. 
B Other Alternatives 
The seats are not the only way to achieve the goals set out by the Royal Commission; 
nor are they necessarily the best way to do so. Other alternatives must be considered 
before a decision whether or not to retain the seats can be made. 
1 Rely ing on MMP alone 
127 Royal Commission, above, 90. 
128 Royal Commission, above, 90. 
129 Royal Commission, above, 89. 
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Abolishing the seats and leavi11g Maori representation m the hands of the general 
voting public is an obvious possibility. MMP has certainly increased the number of Maori 
elected to the House and perhaps this is all that is required to protect taonga, or to express 
the Treaty partnership. With more voices in Parliament, Maori will have more of a stake 
in decision-making. 
However, while the number of Maori MPs has certainly increased, this is not to a level 
proportionate to their population, unless the Maori seats are taken into account. Nor have 
other typically under-represented groups, such as women, attained proportionate 
representation with MMP alone. 130 Relying on only MMP also leaves the possibility that 
no Maori politicians will be elected. 131 If that were to happen, Maori views might be 
effectively ignored. Three of the major parties have based their political platforms on 
treating Maori the same as everyone else despite their unique concerns, 
132 and if a right 
wing government were formed, the extent to which Maori concerns would be represented 
in Parliament is likely to be limited. While the same danger faces minority groups, there 
are reasons why this is more of a concern regarding Maori . As discussed earlier, the 
Treaty requires Maori to play a role in decision-making. 
Even if Maori were elected to Parliament in a general seat, they would not be able to 
campaign effectively for Maori rights when representing a predominantly non-Maori 
130 Women outnumbered men I 05 to I 00 in the 200 I census, see Statistics New Zealand 
<www.stats.govt.nzJdomino/external/web/Prod Serv.nsf/htmldocs/Women> (last accessed 8 July 2003), but 
in Parliament there are only 35 women out of 120 MPs see Parliamentary Services 
<http://www. ps.parliamet.govt.nzJschools/texts/members.html> (last accessed 19 August, 2003). 
131 Although Maori are currently proportionately represented in Parliament (although notably only with the 
Maori seats), this is not the point. Similar arguments were made in respect of the need for a Bill of Rights 
in New Zealand. Although no Government was likely to sweep away basic rights, this might not always be 
so. There is always the danger that they will be gradually eroded, and as such they need proper protection. 
See "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper " [1985) AJHR AS 27 - 28. 
132 See the National Party 's "One Nation" campaign: Hon Bill English, Leader of the National Party 
"Address to the National Party Lower North ls land Regional Conference" (National Party Lower North 
Island Regional Conference, Masterton, 4 May 2003). Also the New Zealand First Race Relations Policy at 
<www.nzfirst.org.nzJpolicies/racerelations.php> (last accessed 6 May 2003), and the ACT Party policies, 
where separate treatment for Maori is labeled racist and discriminatory . For example Stephen Franks, ACT 
New Zealand Maori Affairs Spokesman, "ACT Tautoko for National's Kaupapa" (4 May 2003) Press 
Release. 
United Future believes it is "bad principle to give one class of citizens greater rights than others". See 
United Future Policy on Bi-Cultural ism and Treaty Issues at <www.unitedfuture.org.nzJpolicies/treaty .php> 
(last accessed 6 May 2003). 
28 
electorate, or voting public for the list seats. This would only be possible where their 
party took a pro-Maori stance, which considering the controversy surrounding Maori 
issues such as foreshore rights, is not something the mainstream parties would do lightly. 
"Maori parties"' could do this, but they have so far failed to secure seats under MMP. 
Additional measures are needed. 
2 Complementing MMP with other measures in Parliament 
(a) Removal of the threshold for Maori parties 
Although the Royal Commission recommended abolishing the seats, they did 
recognise that MMP alone would not ensure adequate Maori representation. They 
recommended that the Representation Commission be required to take "the community of 
interest among the members of Maori tribes" into account in determining constituency 
boundaries and also waiving the proposed 4% threshold for parties representing primarily 
Maori interests. 133 In their view, this would provide incentives for non-Maori parties to 
take proper account of Maori concerns and to allow Maori to be able to mount an electoral 
challenge if dissatisfied with the performance of existing parties. 
134 
However, the waiver has been dismissed as unworkable and ineffective - who would 
define a "Maori party" for example? 135 Ironically, under MMP the seats may actually 
provide the advantage that the Royal Commission hoped to engender by waiving the 
threshold for Maori parties once the seats were abolished, as the threshold does not apply 
where one or more party candidates is successful in an electorate seat. 
136 It is unlikely 
that a Maori candidate would be elected to a general constituency when promoting a 
Maori platform, but this is far more likely in the Maori seats. 
(b) Party list requirements 
133 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H3, IOI. 
134 Royal Commission, above, 10 I. 
135 See the Second Reading of the Electoral Bill : Hon DAM Graham (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17085, 
Christopher Laidlaw (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17149 and Hon Mrs T W M Tirikatene-Sullivan (3 August 
1993) 537 NZPD 17100. The MMP Review Committee unanimously rejected the implementation of the 
waiver when it came up for reconsideration in 2001: MMP Review Committee "Inquiry into the Review of 
MMP"[2001] AJHR 123 A, 26 
136 Claudia Geiringer " Reading English in Context" [2003] ZLJ 239, 24 I. 
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Another alternative is to have a compulsory Maori presence on party lists. For 
example, a modified zipper system could be used. This would involve a requirement that 
every sixth list candidate was Maori.137 Another option would be to require that each 
party have at least one Maori in their first ten list candidates. 138 
There are several difficulties with these systems. First, they only apply to the list seats 
and so would only impact on some of the seats in Parliament. Secondly, these systems 
would also have a disproportionate impact on smaller parties who may not receive any 
electorate seats. 139 Thirdly, these measures would rely a great deal on the goodwill of the 
parties themselves. For example, with a guaranteed top ten list placing requirement, 
smaller parties would be able to put a token Maori as their tenth candidate, safe in the 
knowledge that he or she stood no chance of being elected. It might also mean that parties 
refuse to field any Maori in electorate seats. 
Fourthly, MPs would not be as accountable to Maori. They would be elected by the 
whole population and not Maori exclusively, and so would have to consider the non-
Maori majority. However, Maori MPs would not suffer this problem to the same degree 
as Maori list MPs currently. As their positions would be guaranteed to a greater extent, 
Maori list MPs would be better able to adopt Maori stances on important issues without 
fear of losing their list ranking or of sacrificing re-election. On the other hand, if parties 
felt that their voters were being alienated this may cause them to either only put Maori 
candidates low on their lists, or only endorse candidates who will tow the Pakeha line -
relegating the measure to mere tokenism. 
Finally, the fact that it would not be exclusively Maori electing the MPs would mean 
that the parties, and the predominantly non-Maori voting public, would be determining 
137 Every 6th candidate would be equivalent to the proportion of Maori in the general population ( 15%). 
138 See the submissions for improving women 's representation in the MMP Review Committee " Inquiry into 
the ReviewofMMP" [2001] AJHR l 23 A, 42 - 43. 
139 For example the ACT and Green parties currently only have list MPs. Progressive has one li st and one 
electorate, and New Zealand First and United both have more li st than electorate. Only Labour and National 
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who is an appropriate spokesperson for Maori, rather than Maori themselves. These 
measures could therefore be less effective at achieving quality Maori representation, and 
of embodying the Treaty, than the seats have been; and would be equally open to charges 
of unfairness from other groups. 140 
3 Greater recognition of Maori political rights 
While the justification for special Maori representation is the Treaty, it is recognised 
that the Maori seats, even under MMP, nor the alternatives so far discussed, do not make 
Maori an equal Treaty partner. Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest 
that "no Parliamentary decision since 1840 may have been properly and justly made given 
that it would always have been by a legislature in which Maori were completely under-
represented."141 They argue that a partnership requires Maori have half the seats in 
Parliament, to be filled as they wish.
142 This argument relies on the idea of "one partner, 
one vote" rather than "one person, one vote", as is the present position. 
Arguably the very idea of the seats is not in line with the guarantees under the Treaty. 
They are not a particularly effective expression of rangatiratanga, as they necessarily 
operate within a Pakeha institution where Maori are a minority. Some Maori regard the 
seats an attempt to marginalise Maori, and call for their boycott.
143 It can certainly be 
questioned whether Maori should be fighting for guaranteed representation in a Pakeha 
institution such as Parliament, or whether there are more appropriate forms of 
participation available. 
received more electorate than list MPs. See Parliamentary Services at 
http: //www.ps.partliament.govt.nz/schools/texts/membcrs.html (last accessed 19 August 2003). 
140 See Jepson and Dyas-Elliot v The Labour Party [1996] IRLR 166 (ET) where the British Labour Party's 
policy of using all women shortlists in "winnable" seats was held to be sex discrimination in breach of the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Note however that as a result of this decision the Sex Discrimination 
(Election Candidates) Act 2002 (UK) was passed which allows political parties to adopt positive quotas in 
selecting candidates. 
141 Simon Reeves To Honour the Treaty: The Argument for Equal Seats (2 ed, Earth Restoration Limited, 
Auckland, 1996) x. 
142 
Reeves, above, I. 
143 See Dr Ranginui Walker's comments in Helen Bain "A Matter of Choice for Maori" (9 April 2001) The 
Dominion Wellington 12. Also, Appendix III to the Plenary Resolutions in Ranginui Walker ( ed) Maori 
Representation Conference Tura11gaivae1vae Marae 26 - 27 April 1985 (Centre for Continuing Education, 
University of Auckland, Auckland, 1985). 
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Greater Maori rights have been considered in the past. Britain recognised Maori 
sovereignty as expressed by the 1835 Declaration of Independence, and despite later 
statements to the contrary, 144 it is clear that Maori have long been capable of governing 
both themselves and others. Before the Treaty was signed, the possibility of a Maori body 
governing both races was considered, as was a separate Maori government, and 
incorporation of the Chiefs into a European style government. 145 While these were 
ultimately rejected, the Pakeha Government did continue to recognise the possibility of 
Maori governance. Section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852 (UK) allowed the Crown to 
create districts where Maori could govern both races according to their own laws and 
customs so long as these were "not repugnant to the Principles of Humanity". While this 
provision was never invoked, it was not repealed until 1986. 
When considering alternatives, we must be mindful that time has passed and it is no 
longer possible to put things back the way they were prior to 1840. A modem, forward 
thinking solution must be achieved. Two main alternatives will be discussed - a separate 
Maori state and Parliamentary reform. While these alternatives may seem extreme now, 
race relations in New Zealand have come a long way in the last twenty years and what 
then seemed impossible now exists. We should not close our minds to the possibilities.
146 
(a) A separate state 
The concept of a Maori state is well founded. There is a shared cultural heritage, 
physical distinctiveness, a pre-colonisation history, aspirations of self-determination and a 
144 See the comments of Prendergast J in Wi Para/a v The Bishop of Wellington ( 1877) 3 Jur R (NS) 72, 77 -
78 (SC) where he states that "The Maori tribes were incapable of performing the duties and therefore of 
assuming the rights of a civilised community." He goes on to state that as such they were incapable of 
having sovereignty, let alone ceding it. This approach has long since been departed from in the Courts. See 
for example Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori land Board [1941] NZLR 590 (PC) per Viscount 
Simon LC for the Court, where the Treaty was held to be a valid treaty of cession, implying that Maori did 
indeed have sovereignty to cede pre-1840. 
145 Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, Wellington , 1987) 
29, 31. 
146 Overseas examples show what can be done. For example, Lebanon 's National Assembly reformed its 
parliament in 1990 so that the Christian majority (both politically and based on population) now shares half 
32 
rejection of non-Maori as the appropriate authors of Maori policy. 147 Furthermore, even 
after the Treaty was signed Maori still exercised autonomy in certain areas, 148 and later 
attempts were made to establish independent and sovereign Maori communities, such as 
Parihaka. While- none of these communities has endured, with a modem reinvention of 
section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, a modified concept of Maori 
Districts might still be possible. 149 
Federalism has been one suggestion. This provides extensive self-government for a 
national minority, as it guarantees the ability to make decisions without being outvoted by 
the dominant group in the larger society. 150 New Zealand could be divided into four 
provinces - Upper North Island, Auckland and surrounds, Lower North Island and the 
South Island. 151 Each province would have the same status and have its own government 
and revenue. As Maori are predominant in the North, they would effectively have control 
over that province and would thus enjoy a measure of self-determination, although non-
Maori living within the province would equaJly be able to participate, at least in theory.
152 
The obvious problem with such a proposal, however, is that Maori are not 
concentrated in one geographical area, but can be found throughout New Zealand.
153 As 
such, any efforts to federalise New Zealand by creating a Maori State would be fraught 
with difficulties: Why should one iwi's ancestral lands be chosen over another? Would 
Maori have to give up resources outside the state that Maori have traditionally used? 
Even if Maori could agree as to what area should be chosen, there are other difficulties 
of its 108 seat parliament with Muslims, as opposed to the 5-4 ratio they previously enjoyed: Simon Reeves 
To Honour the Treaty: The Argument for Equal Seats (2 ed, Earth Restoration Limited, Auckland, 1996) 53. 
147 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001 ), 464, 473. 
148 FM Brookfield Waitangi and indigenous Rights: Revolwion, Lmv and Legitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999) 114 - 115. 
149 FM Brookfield "The New Zealand Constitution - the Search for Legitimacy" in I 1-1 Kawharu (ed) 
Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1989) 1, 14. 
150 Geoff Gilbert "Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?" (2002) 35 Cornell Intl 
LJ 307,337. 
151 Raj Vasil " Indigenous Rights and the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 214,217. 
152 Vasil, above, 217. 
153 Vasil, above, 217 
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such as the extent of their law making powers. 154 Would Maori really be able to govern 
the state as they saw fit, or would the governance structure be imposed by Parliament? 
While overseas examples of Greenland and Nunavut can be pointed to as self-
government successes, their application in New Zealand is somewhat limited. 155 Both are 
marginal economic areas in hostile environments where there were few opportunities for 
commercial exploitation. The populations were overwhelmingly indigenous anyway, and 
so there was little protest over the extension of administrative powers to the indigenous 
peoples. 156 Furthermore, both states have been extremely costly to establish. 157 
Although, generally, New Zealand society 1s too integrated to establish a separate 
state, this may still be possible in the Ureweras where the Tuhoe were originally to have 
self-government under the Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896. 158 Just because it 
may not be possible to set aside a piece of land like this for Maori elsewhere is not a 
reason for denying Tuhoe. 159 However, if Tuhoe were to get such self-government rights 
some alternative would surely have to be offered to other Maori for whom this is not 
possible. 
As an alternative, a state based on ethnicity instead of territoriality could be 
established. 160 Maori would have their own branches of government and laws, while still 
154 For example, in the United States of America, the American criminal code applies on Indian reservations 
but not tax laws for example. 
155 Greenland was granted self rule by Denmark by the Home Rule Act 1979. Nunavut is a self governing 
territory in Canada. It is governed by the indigenous Inuit people. Ken S Coates "International Perspectives 
on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri 
Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 
65. 
156 For example, the cost of establishing Nunavut was about $1 billion, without considering the ongoing 
operating costs: Ken S Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S 
Coates and PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New 
Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 65. 
157 Ken S Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and PG 
McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 65. 
158 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999) 172. 
159 Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, above, 172. 
160 Raj Vasil "Indigenous Rights and the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 214, 217- 218. 
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living in the same geographical area as non-Maori. The difficulty with such a situation is 
enforcement. Would people be able to claim membership when it suited them, for 
example to escape criminal or tax law, while at the same time reaping the benefits of the 
existing State? There are already complaints that there is one law for Maori and another 
for non- Maori, 161 and an ethnic state would only fuel this resentment. 
(b) Parliamentary reforms 
Rather than a separate Government, there have also been proposals to increase Maori 
participation in the current system. There has been a number of attempts at a Maori 
Parliament since 1840, 162 or perhaps even before,
163 and similar proposals still exist today. 
A separate House of Representatives requires a structure parallel to the established 
Parliament. This would work in conjunction with the Crown, in much the same way that 
the Sarni Parliament and the Norwegian Government or the Assembly of First Nations and 
the Canadian Government interact.
164 A separate Parliament would mean that Maori 
would not have to continually struggle to avoid being swamped by mainstream politics 
and securing a fair deal from Pakeha. 165 
161 See National Party policy of"One citizenship for all" which states that currently there are different rules 
for Maori and Pakeha, and that this should be changed. 
162 For example, the second Maori King Tawhaio suggested a Legislative Council of Chiefs to then Native 
Minister John Ballance, who rejected the proposal. Tawhaio established his own Convention of Chiefs 
called Kauhanganui in 1891 anyway. It was largely based on Westminster principles and had a written 
constitution, and even provided for a judiciary. 
Other attempts include those of Paremata Maori to establish a separate Maori Parliament with the Native 
Rights Bill 1884. The European MPs left the House so that there was no quorum to hear the Bill. 
The Kotahitanga movement fought for the establishment of a Maori Parliament with full and equal 
participation in the functions of State for Maori. 
See M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I), 464, 465 - 466; and Claudia 
Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1987) 226. 
163 James Busby, the British Resident in New Zealand, saw this assembly of Chiefs for the Declaration of 
lndependence in 1835 as the beginnings of a Maori Parliament. See MPK Sorrenson "Appendix B: A 
History of Maori Representation in Parliament" , 8-7 in the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
"Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H3. 
164 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001), 464,474. 
165 Raj Vasil What do the Maori Want ? New Maori Political Perspectives (Random Century, Auckland, 
1990) 68. 
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Other proposals call for the establishment of an upper house. New Zealand had a 
Legislative Council until 1950, which included at least one Maori representative from 
1872 onwards.
166 Contemporary proposals for a new upper house vary in that some 
require complete Maori membership, others merely proportional, 
167 and others a 50-50 
split. 168 In most cases the upper house would monitor proposed legislation to ensure it is 
consistent with the Treaty.
169 
The ideas of a Maori senate and a separate Maori lower house have also been 
combined. 17° Consistent with their ideal of a bicultural nation, the New Zealand Maori 
Council has endorsed Parliamentary reform. They have proposed a Senate (ten Maori, 
ten non-Maori) and two legislative bodies, a chamber of Maori representatives (fifteen 
members) and a general chamber (eighty five members). This is arguably more consistent 
with the idea of a partnership, as there is greater equality of voting rights.
171 
However, there are a number of issues to be worked through before such arrangements 
can be implemented. Any establishment of a Maori Parliament should be just that, the 
question is whether non-Maori would accept it. Maori should not be forced to work 
within the Pakeha Westminster system.
172 If a Maori Parliament or upper House is 
established, members should be elected according to Maori values and definitions of 
"democracy". 173 It must incorporate tikanga Maori, 
174 and be established with the 
consent of Maori. Maori have increasingly come to view Pakeha political institutions as 
166 The Waitangi Tribunal The Maori Electoral Option Report: Wai 413 (Brookers, Wellington, 1994) 6. 
167 R J O'Connor The Future of Maori Representation in Parliament [1991] NZLJ 175, 178. 
168 See Appendix III to the Plenary Resolutions in Ranginui Walker (ed) Maori Representation Conference 
Turangawaewae Marae 26-27 April 1985 (Centre for Continuing Education, University of Auckland, 
Auckland, 1985) 19. 
169 See for example Appendix J 11 to the Plenary Resolutions in Walker ( ed), above, 19. 
170 See Appendix Jil to the Plenary Resolutions in Ranginui Walker (ed), above, 20. 
171 M H Durie "The Treaty of Waitangi: Perspectives for Social Policy" in I H Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: 
Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 280, 
297. 
172 Simon Reeves To Honour the Treaty: The Argument for Equal Seats (2 ed, Earth Restoration Limited, 
Auckland, 1996) 65. 
173 Reeves, above, 66. 
174 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001), 464,474. 
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tools for Pakeha domination and Maori subordination and there should be flexibility in 
any new constitutional arrangements. 175 
The difficulty· here is that Maori tikanga would not necessarily allow all Maori to 
participate. Maori women for example may find themselves shut out.
176 One would hope 
that Maori would adopt suitable methods for choosing representatives that allowed all 
Maori to contribute, but what should be done if Maori do not? 
Many non-Maori, even those in favour of giving Maori a fair deal, may find a Maori 
Parliament difficult to accept. It involves placing limits on the sovereignty of Parliament, 
and challenges the idea of a single nation. 
177 In New Zealand Maori calls for 
rangatiratanga are often interpreted as separatist, and that whatever Maori gain somehow 
takes away from the rest of the nation. However, there does not have to be a zero sum 
equation, as the experiences of Canada and the United States of America show.
178 Maori 
can gain greater rights without detracting from the overall sovereignty of the State. 
179 
Non-Maori may be more willing to accept an independent Maori body that advises, 
but is not binding on the Crown. However, Maori would probably only see this as an 
interim solution at best, and would have trouble accepting it as an expression of self-
determination, 180 as any such body would still be dependent on Pakeha participation to 
175 Raj Vasil What do the Maori Want? New Maori Political Perspectives (Random Century, Auckland, 
1990) 66. 
176 See Ani Mikaere "Maori and Self Determination in Aotearoa/New Zea land" (Sarni Parliament 
Conference on Sarni Determination, Arvidsjaur, Sweden, 28 May 1999) 13. Here she labels the New 
Zealand Maori Council a " large ly male and conservative constitution". Would the same fate await a Maori 
Parliament? 
177 Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake", above, 474. 
178 In both Canada and the United States of America, an inherent right of First Nations to self- government is 
recognised. In the United States this was recognised by the Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v Georgia 
30 US (5 Pet) 1 ( 183 1) Marshall CJ and in Canada by s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 1982 
(UK), sch B) and Campbell v British Colombia (Attorney-General) (2000) 189 DLR ( 4th) 333 (BCSC) 
Williamson J. 
179 Patricia Sarr " Introduction" in Ken S Coates and PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The 
Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (V ictoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 9, 14. 
180 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001), 464, 474 - 475. 
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avoid becoming marginalised and impotent.
181 For example, many Maori have become 
disillusioned with the New Zealand Maori Council. Despite its effectiveness as a Maori 
political body, the Council has had trouble shaking of the image of being a State 
institution. 182 
To be effective, any proposal must give Maori the power to have a real impact on 
legislation. For example, while the Sarni Parliament is an impressive idea, it has only 
limited decision-making powers and mainly provides advice to the Norwegian 
Parliament. 183 Arguably this does not go far enough in providing self-government. 
184 
Mason Durie suggests that any national Maori body politic must be consistent with tino 
rangatiratanga. As such, it must have authority to: 
185 
• Formulate Maori policy 
• Manage and implement Maori policy 
• Actively participate in the development and interpretation of law 
• Plan for the needs of future generations 
• Audit national policies and legislation 
• Make appointments to national Maori institutions and Maori appointments to 
Crown agencies 
• Control and manage public spending for Maori 
• Develop foreign policy for Maori 
• Pursue Maori interests abroad. 
Non-Maori express concern that if Maori had these powers, they could hold the 
country to ransom. This is scaremongering, and fails to realise that Maori need an 
181 Raj Vasil What do the Maori Want ? New Maori Political Perspectives (Random Century, Auckland, 
1990) 128. 
182 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999) 151. 
183 Ken S Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and 
PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 57. 
184 Coates, above, 57. Nevertheless, even with limited powers the existence of such a Parliament is 
important symbolically and is the first step in allowing greater rights to evolve. 
185 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nation" in Raymond Miller (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001), 464,473. 
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effective govenunent too. Any parliamentary reforms would require sensible g
ive and 
take between the Maori and non-Maori representatives. If non-Maori were accep
ting of 
Maori concerns, there is no reason why Maori would not return the favour. For e
xample, 
while Maori might'want to establish Jaws promoting te reo in the classroom, they
 would 
equally see the need for sensible Jaws regulating education generally. 
Maori are not agreed on the benefits of a separate Parliament either. There is con
cern 
that a separate Parliament would decrease the influence of Maori in main
stream 
politics.
186 Despite the obvious impact on Maori of general legislation concerning health 
or welfare, there is a worry that Maori may in fact get relegated to "Maori issues
" only. 
Thus any division in jurisdiction between the two Parliaments would need to be c
arefully 
considered. 
There are also particular concerns as to whether it would undermine tribal authorit
y to 
negotiate their own affairs.
187 Tribes have their own autonomy and are unable to speak 
for one another.
188 This was seen as a significant reason for the failure of Mana Motuhake 
to gain more than a few northern tribes ' acceptance despite the leadership o
f Matiu 
Rata. 189 As such, it could be argued that any political organi sations would have to
 be iwi 
based, with pan-Maori concerns pursued through confederations of such organisat
ions.190 
However, despite current difficulties in getting different iwi to agree, 
191 some suggest that 
with greater prosperity and education, Maori will come to see past tribali sm and f
ocus on 
wider Maori concems.
192 
(c) Feasibility of a Maori state or Parliamentary reforms 
186 Coates, above, 42. 
187 M H Durie "Mana Maori Motuhake The State of the Maori Nati on" in Ray mond M
ill er (ed) New 
Zealand Government and Politics (Oxford Uni versity Press, A uckl and, 200 I), 464, 47
3. 
188 M H Durie "The Treaty of Waitang i: Perspectives for Social Policy" in l H Kawh
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Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford Univers ity Press, A
uckl and, 1989) 280, 
297. 
189 Raj Vasil What do the Maori Want? New Maori Political Perspectives (Random Cen
tury, Auckl and, 
1990) 68. 
190 Vasil , above, 68- 69. 
19 1 See the problems in allocating the Fishing quota, for example. This is a refl ection
 of the different needs, 
ideals, and capabilities of the iwi . 
192 See Vas il , above, 70. 
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There are many issues to be worked through before either alternative raised could 
become a reality. The difficulties in getting Maori and non-Maori to agree, combined 
with the difficulties of getting either party to agree within themselves, are immense. 
While certainly the examples of a Sarni Parliament or the Nunavut State can be cited 
as showing that such arrangements are possible, care must be taken when trying to 
translate these to a New Zealand environment.
193 For example, New Zealand does not 
have the same large tracts of land where few non-indigenous people live that made the 
Nisga'a settlement possible.
194 If we do implement one of these arrangements, we should 
learn from the overseas experiences, but take care to make it relevant and effective for 
New Zealand circumstances. 
This all takes time and money. Considering the controversy over the seats, if either 
alternative is to become a reality, it will not be for a Jong time yet.
195 The seats certainly 
should not be abolished until replaced by a more suitable expression of rangatiratanga. 
Even if a separate Maori state or Parliament were established, Maori representation of 
some description would still be required in the non-Maori House.
196 Much of the policy 
of the existing Pakeha Government would inevitably impact, either directly or indirectly, 
on Maori government. 197 Moreover, the likelihood of other options actually coming into 
fruition depends largely on the performance of the Maori MPs in Parliament anyway.
198 
Therefore, while not the strongest possible expression of Treaty rights, they may be the 
best currently available, and are necessary in order to implement anything more. 
VI WIDER IMPLICATIONS: THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 
193 Ken S Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and PG 
McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 42. 
194 Coates, above, 42. 
195 Coates, above, 75. 
196 Trevor Knight "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada" (200 I ) 46 McGill LJ I 063, I 094. 
197 Knight, above, I 094. 
198 Jonathon Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, Nigel S Roberts New Zealand Under MMP: A 
New Politics? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996) 70. 
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So far, only the rights of Maori have been examined. Consistently with their rights 
under the Treaty, and with their role as tangata whenua, they are entitled to effective 
guaranteed representation in Parliament, and that the seats are an effective way of doing 
this. However, the' majority of New Zealanders are non-Maori, and their rights must be 
balanced against the rights of Maori to separate representation. For example, complete 
Maori sovereignty would clearly embody rangatiratanga under the Treaty, and would give 
Maori strong representation, but would have a disparate impact on the non-Maori 
members of society. 
In order to determine whether the seats infringe the rights of other groups, they must 
be examined under the proper legal framework - the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (the Bill of Rights). The Bill of Rights applies to all acts done by the legislative, 
executive or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand, or by any person in the 
performance of a public function, power or duty imposed by law.
199 The provisions of 
the Electoral Act 1993 passed by the Legislature and implemented by the Executive are 
clearly covered by the Bill of Rights. However, as Parliament is able to pass any law it 
likes, even if legislation passed is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, it must be upbeld.
200 
The most that can be achieved is a declaration of inconsistency.
201 
If a declaration of inconsistency were issued, the validity of the seats would be 
undermined, and this would be a strong argument in favour of their abolition. Such a 
declaration could be sought on two bases - that they discriminate against non-Maori in 
breach of section 19 of the Bill of Rights, or that they breach the right to elections of equal 
suffrage under section 12. 
A Discrimination? 
1 What is discrimination? 
199 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
200 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
201 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review (1999) 5 HRNZ 224, 234 (CA). 
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Only Maori can register on the Maori roll and vote for the Maori seats.
202 The 
Electoral Act defines Maori as a person of the Maori race of New Zealand, and their 
descendants.
203 This has lead some non-Maori to label the seats "discriminatory", some 
have even go so far as to call them a form of apartheid.
204 Discrimination is divisive to a 
community and should not be encouraged. 
Section 19( 1) of the Bill of Rights states that everyone has the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds set out in the Human Rights Act 1993. One of these 
grounds is discrimination based on race. 
205 
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the Human Rights Act defines "discrimination". The 
White Paper left open the question of whether discrimination incorporates the idea of 
'something unjustified, unreasonable, or irrelevant', or whether a mere distinction was 
enough.206 It was of the opinion that the result would be the same in either interpretation 
because even if only a mere distinction were needed, section 5 justified limitations would 
still apply.207 However, it does note that section 19 does not require identical treatment in 
every respect. 208 
The New Zealand courts have not, as yet, given a definitive meanmg to 
discrimination, but some guidance can be found in the Court of Appeal case of Quilter v 
Attorney-General. 209 This dealt with the question of whether the Marriage Act 1955 
allowed for same-sex marriages, and if not, whether that was discrimination. Despite the 
different approaches of the Court, the judges were unanimous that discrimination involved 
a distinction based on a prohibited ground and that not all distinctions were 
202 Electoral Act 1993, s 76. 
203 Electoral Act 1993, s 3. 
204 See comments of then Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake in 1965. Cited in MPK Sorrenson "Appendix 
B: A History of Maori Representation in Parliament", B - 50, in The Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System "Towards a Better Democracy" [ 1986] AJHR H 3. 
205 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1)(f). 
206 "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" [ 1984] I AJHR A6, 80. 
207 A White Paper, above, 86. 
208 A White Paper, above, 86. 
209 [1998] 1 NZLR523(CA). 
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d. · · 210 1scnmmatory. Inherent in thi" is the idea that there must be some element of 
unfairness before even prima facie discrimination is found. 
The unfairness requirement is in line with international documents ratified by New 
Zealand, which may be of assistance when interpreting domestic legislation.211 For 
example, Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination defines racial discrimination as: 21 2 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economjc, social, cultural or any other field of human life. 
In evaluating whether an action is contrary to the Convention the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination is required to ascertain whether that action has an 
"unjustifiable disparate impact" on a group distinguished by race, colour, descent or 
. l . . 213 nat10na ongm. 
When this is applied to the Maori seats, the fact that only Maori can register for those 
seats is a distinction based on race. However, whether this involves disadvantage to non-
Maori is a more difficult question. 
The concern is that Maori are guaranteed representation in the House, when other 
identifiable groups, who are similarly under-represented in Parliament, do not receive the 
same guarantee and so are disadvantaged.214 Admittedly, the seats give Maori greater 
210 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523 (CA). See Gault J at paras 527, Thomas J at paras 532 -
540, and Tipping J (Richardson J concurring) at paras 573. 
211 Northern Health Regional Authority v Human Rights Commission ( 1997) 4 1 IRNZ 37, 58 (HC) 
Cartwright J. 
212 CERD (25 October 1966) 660 UNTS 291. 
213 Definition of Discrimination in CERD General Recommendation 14 (General Comments), Forty-second 
session, A/48/18 (22 March 1993), Art I para I. 
214 In the Bill of Rights s 7 report for the Local Government Bill 200 I, clause 12.4, which would amend the 
Local Electoral Act 200 I so that Maori wards or constituencies could be created, was considered to be prima 
facie discrimination on this basis. (This was ultimately done under the Local Electoral Amendment Act 
2002). Contrast this with other measures in the Bill to encourage Maori participation such as consultation 
with Maori, or the requirement to take into account Maori culture and traditions, for example. These were 
not found to be prima facie discrimination as such considerations were not required to be at the exclusion of 
other groups: Ministry of Justice Preliminary Legal Advice: Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
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opportunity to influence legislation and put across their point of view. The existence of 
guaranteed seats for Maori also means that there are seven less seats to represent the 1ews 
of non-Maori. 
However, the Maori seats do not prevent people of any other racial backgrounds from 
exercising their right to vote. Although they cannot vote on the Maori roll they are still 
entitled to vote on the General roll, providing they meet the criteria. 215 The Maori eats 
do not affect the make up of the other 113 seats in Parliament. New Zealand has a wide 
range of groups represented in Parliament including men and women, heterosexuals, 
transsexuals, homosexuals, Rastafarians, Muslims, a wide range of Christians, New 
Zealand Europeans, Maori, Asians, and Polynesians. These are spread across six parties 
with a variety of political stances, and between them represent electorates covering all of 
New Zealand. 
It is also important to remember that the seats are part of the general New Zealand 
Parliament and are responsible for making the general law of New Zealand.216 They are 
not making a separate law for Maori. This suggests that the seats are not discriminatory. 
2 Positive discrimination 
Even if there were some disadvantage to another group as a consequence of the seats, 
this is not necessarily discrimination. The aim is equal outcomes rather than equal 
treatment. Evidence shows that equal outcomes are best achieved if individual 
backgrounds are taken into account.217 While it would be ideal if everyone could achieve 
the same results without disadvantaging any other group, this is not always possible. 
Generally in order to advance equality something must be taken from the advantaged 
Rights Act 1990: Local Government Bi/12001 (5 December 2001) confirmed in Ministry of Justice legal 
Advice: Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Local Governmel1f Bill 2001 ( 17 
December 200 l ). 
215 See Electoral Act 1993, s 80 for disqualifications for registration. 
216 Royal Commission on the Electoral System "Towards a Better Democracy" [1986) AJHR 1-13, 94. 
217 M H Durie "The Treaty ofWaitangi: Perspectives for Social Policy" in 11-1 Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: 
Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 280, 
288. 
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group and given to those less favourably situated.218 
discrimination. 
This does not constitute 
Section 19(2) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that: 
Measures taken in good faith for the purposes of assisting or advancing per ons or groups 
disadvantaged because of discrimination that is unlawful by virtue of Part II of the Human Rights 
Act 1993 do not constitute discrimination. 
Thus for the seats to qualify as positive discrimination -
• The system must be implemented in good faith 
• The purpose must be to assist or advance a disadvantaged group 
• That group must be disadvantaged due to unlawful discrimination under Article II of 
the Human Rights Act 
The first criterion is perhaps the most straight forward. The retention of the seats has 
been carefully considered by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, the House 
of Representatives, and The MMP Review Committee. The decision to retain them was 
not made lightly, and was an important issue when our electoral system was reviewed in 
1993. 
The seats were retained on the basis that Maori and Pakeha wanted them kept, 
alternative suggestions for advancing Maori representation were not workable, the 
disadvantaged position of Maori in our society, and the constitutional importance of the 
seats.
219 
Their existence remains under continual scrutiny as shown by the National Party 
218 
Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994) 3 NZLR 323,340 (11 ) per Thorp Jin relation to the 
affirmative action provisions of the Human Rights Act. 
219 
See debate at the second reading of the Electoral Bill (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17082 onwards. 
Particularly Hon D A M Graham (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17085, Christoph~r Laidlaw (3 August 1993) 
537 NZPD 17149 and Hon Mrs T WM Tirikatene-Sullivan (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17100. 
The seats were not originally contained in the Bill, although some members also make comments supporting 
them at the Bill's introduction. See Hon Mrs TW M Tirikatene-Sullivan ( 15 December 1992) 532 NZPD 
13167 - 13168 and Steve Maharey ( 15 December 1992) 532 NZPD 13171 - 13172. 
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calls for their abolition earlier this year. 220 The seats are a measure to boost Maori 
representation made in good faith, not as a means of disadvantaging any other group. 
As a positive discrimination measure, the purpose of the seats could be regarded as 
either a means of giving Maori proportionate representation in Parliament, or as a way of 
addressing their wider socio-economic disadvantage. On either analysis the aim is to help 
a disadvantaged group. The importance of proving that the group is disadvantaged is 
demonstrated by the decision in Amaltal Fishing Co Ltd v Nelson Polytechnic, 221 which 
dealt with a fishing cadet course where all places were reserved for Maori or Pacific 
Island applicants, and their fees fully paid. The Complaints Review Tribunal found that 
the action was taken in good faith and that it was done for the purpose of assisting or 
advancing a group of a particular race, but due to lack of evidence, could not be satisfied 
that those persons needed assistance to achieve an equal place in society.222 
The evidence here shows that without the Maori seats, Maori would be under-
d . p 1· 223 represente m ar iament. Maori also continue to lag far behind non-Maori on many 
socio-economic indices. For example, Maori have significantly lower life expectancy,224 
d d . I . . 22s an are overrepresente m unemp oyment statistics. When employed, Maori are 
concentrated in lower paid occupations and can expect to be paid less than a non-Maori 
with the same qualifications.226 Mason Durie states that: 227 
220 See Hon Bill English, Leader of the National Party "Address to the National Party Lower North Island 
Regional Conference" (National Party Lower North Island Regional Conference, Masterton, 4 May 2003). 
221 [1996) NZAR 97. 
222 Amaltal Fishing Co Ltd v Nelson Polytechnic [ 1996) NZAR 97, 113. 
223 In total 18 MPs in Parliament identify themselves as Maori, seven of these representing Maori seats. 
This is 15% of the seats in the House, equivalent to the Maori 15% of the population. However, when only 
the 113 General seats are considered, Maori make up 9.7% of these seats. (Although of course this would 
probably have been higher if the two rolls were merged.) 
224 Maori life expectancy is lower than that of non-Maori by about 7 years, although the gap is narrowing. 
See Statistics New Zealand: Life Expectancy and Death Rates - Family: 
http://www/stats.govt.nzldomino/externa1/Web/nzstories.nsf/092edeb76ed5aa6bcc256afe008 J d84e/82dfd78 
8a5ad2lclcc756b I 80004bacf'?OpenDocument (last accessed 23 July 2003) 
225 See Statistics New Zealand: Unemployment - Family: 
http ://www/sta ts. govt.nz/ domino/ex tern a 1/W cb/nzs Lori es. ns f/092edeb 7 6cd 5aa6bc(.;256a f e008 I d 84e/ 4cc3eca 
005978 I 7fcc256b 1800046afc?OpenDocument (last accessed 23 July 2003) 
226 See Statistics New Zealand Concentration in Lower Paid Occupations - Family: 
http ://www/s ta ts.govt. nzl domino/ex tern a 1/W eb/nzs tori es. ns f/092edeb 7 6ed 5aa6bcc2 56a f e008 I d 84e/0003 8a0 
8326dbb77cc')56b 1800034e9b?OpenDocument (last accessed 23 July 2003) 
46 
on every measure of well-being, there are severe disparities between Maori and non-Maori; and 
that an objective of the Treaty, to provide for British government and settlement without 
disadvantage to Maori people, has not been achieved. 
The technical difficulty in applying section 19(2) is that the disadvantage must be due 
to discrimination on a prohibited ground. It is not always possible to show actual 
discriminatory acts against the group, despite general social disadvantage resulting in their 
under-representation in the activity.228 Colour, Race and Ethnic origins are all prohibited 
grounds of discrimination under Part II of the Human Rights Act,229 but in order to justify 
the seats this must be linked to Maori under-representation in Parliament, or their social 
disadvantage. 
Once the objective has been suitably defined, the next step is to consider whether the 
special measures aimed at assisting the disadvantaged group are rationally and logically 
connected to that objective. 230 Obviously if the purpose is to increase Maori 
representation in Parliament, then guaranteed seats are a logical means of doing this. If 
the purpose is to alleviate social and economic disadvantages, the basis is less clear. 
Although directly addressing these problems via education, health and employment 
initiatives would be a more rational way of achieving these goals, the Maori MPs may be 
necessary to bring attention to these problems and push for funding. It is widely accepted 
that equality of civil and political rights is interconnected with the enjoyment of socio-
. · h 231 economic ng ts. 
227 M H Durie "The Treaty of Waitangi: Perspectives for Social Policy" in I H Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: 
Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 280, 
287. 
228 For example, male schoolteachers are an under represented group but this may not be because of 
discrimination, but for other reasons: Ministry of Justice The Non-Discrimination Standards for Government 
and the Public Sector (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2002) 21. 
229 Human Rights Act 1993, s 2 I ( e ), (f) and (g) respectively. 
230 Roberts v Ontario ( 1994) 117 DLR ( 4th) 297. Note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were of gre,,t importance in drafting 
the Bill of Rights, and the White Paper invites lawyers and Courts in New Zealand to draw on Canadian 
jurisprudence where relevant: "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" [1984] I AJHR A6, 65. 
231 CL Ryan "Discrimination Against Maoris and Islanders In New Zealand" in WA McKean (ed) Essays 
on Race Relations and the Law in New Zealand (Sweet & Maxwell, Wellington, 1971) 81, 83. 
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The Maori seats qualify as a positive discrimination measure and it is hard to see how 
a challenge from Pakeha could succeed. Pakeha are in the majority in Parliament, and 
enjoy an advantageous place in society. The Maori seats do little to disturb this. 
Furthermore, the very reason for having positive discrimination clauses is to prevent such 
groups from using "equality before the law" to strike down programmes from which they 
are excluded.232 This was considered so self-evident that the Bill of Rights did not 
originally include a positive discrimination clause. 233 
A worthier claim could come from another ethnic minority with similar difficulties 
accessing the political process, or who suffer similar disadvantage. If positive 
discrimination is the rationale then should not all disadvantaged groups receive the same 
protection? Positive discrimination measures should not be a means of authorising 
discrimination between disadvantaged groups. 234 The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination suggests that where an affirmative action provision 
maintains separate rights for different racial groups, this is still discrimination.235 On this 
basis it could be argued that since the Maori seats maintain separate rights for different 
groups, they should be discontinued. 
However, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
has praised Government initiatives to address disadvantage of Maori and other ethnic 
minorities in New Zealand.236 The Committee had the provisions of the Electoral Act 
232 Roberts v Ontario (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 297, 302 - 303 (per Houlden JA), 315 (per Finlayson JA), 332 -
333 (per Weiler JA). 
233 "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" [ 1984) I AJHR A6, 86. Section 19(2) was 
ultimately included as the Justice and Law Reform Committee considered that it was best to make the 
position clear, and that it might also serve an educative function: Justice and Law Reform Committee 
"Interim Report of the Inquiry into the White Paper - A Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [1986) AJHR 1-
8A, 51. 
234 Roberts v Ontario, above, 303 per Houlden JA. Finlayson JA dissented from the majority decision on the 
basis that an incidental discriminatory effect within the target group of a special programme should not of 
itself disqualify it from the protection of the affirmative action clause. o rational connection must be 
shown but if it is, then that is a complete answer to claims of discrimination. The discrimination could be 
justified on another basis. (See pages 318-319). 
235 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimim,tion, (25 October 1966) 
660 UNTS 291, Article 1.4. 
236 The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade New Zealand's Ji"IJ3'"IJ4'" Periodic Report 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination at 
www.mfat.govt.nzJforeign/humanrights/conventions/cerclupclate.html (last accessed 15 July 2003). 
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outlined to them in New Zealand's 121h, I 311, and 14th Consolidated Report to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.237 The Committee welcomed the 
introduction of amendme?ts to the electoral system, particularly the Maori electoral 
option, noting that it contributed to an appreciable increase in the representation of Maori 
in Parliament.
238 
Furthennore, if representation were guaranteed to all disadvantaged 
groups, floodgates problems would have to be overcome.239 But as previously noted, 
there are good reasons based on Maori status as tangata whenua and as a Treaty partner, 
why Maori warrant guaranteed representation when others do not. 
3 Is a positive discrimination analysis appropriate? 
While the Maori seats could constitute an affirmative action measure and are 
justifiable on that basis, this is not the best way of viewing the seats. To view them as a 
positive discrimination measure gives some substance to ACT's claim that the seats are 
patronising and imply Maori are in need of protection.24° Furthermore, a positive 
discrimination analysis does not really answer the question of why other disadvantaged 
groups do not receive similar representation. More importantly, it views the seats as a 
temporary measure. The essence of positive discrimination measures is that they aim to 
redress some imbalance or disadvantage. Once that disadvantage is gone, the measure 
must also disappear. This means that when Maori achieve proportionate seats in 
Parliament without the need for guaranteed representation, or depending on how the 
objective is defined, Maori achieve an equal position in New Zealand society, then the 
seats must be abolished. The idea of 'extra' rights for Maori does not fit comfortably 
within this framework. 241 To keep them when they have done their job would be 
discrimination. 
237 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: 
http://vvww.mft.govt.nz/foreign/humanrights/reports/ I 2th I 4thperioclicreports.html (last accessed 18 July 
2003), para 149 - 155. 
238 See CERD A/57/18 (2002) at 
http://www.bavefsky.com/docs.php/area/conclobs/state/ 123/node/3/treaty/cerd (last accessed I 8 July 2003). 
239 Mai Chen and Sir Geoffrey Palmer Public Law in NelV Zealand: Cases, Materids, Commentary and 
Questions (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 700 - 70 I. 
240 MMP Review Committee "Inquiry into the Review of MMP"[2001] AJI IR I 23 A, 21. 
241 Benedict Kingsbury "Competing Conceptual Approaches to Indigenous Group Jssues in ew Zealand" 
(2002) 52 UTLJ IOI, 105. 
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However, the issue of guaranteed Maori representation 1s not just about ensuring 
Maori are heard in Parliam_ent; but about acknowledging their special relationship with the 
Crown and their status as the indigenous people of New Zealand. A positive 
discrimination analysis ignores these important reasons for having the seats - the status of 
Maori as tangata whenua, and the Treaty of Waitangi, as discussed earlier. These 
arguments warrant protected seats regardless of Maori socioeconomic position, or their 
numbers in Parliament. To treat the seats as anything less undervalues their importance. 
The relationship between the Crown and Maori is ongoing. While governments may 
prefer to view things on the basis that any issue, whether related to land or constitutional 
aspirations, can be settled once and for all, indigenous peoples approach grievances from a 
completely different standpoint.242 Indigenous groups tend to approach the problem as 
one step on the path towards cultural survival.243 The seats must be viewed as a long-term 
measure. Although they help to address Maori disadvantage, they are required regardless 
of this, and so long as there are Maori in New Zealand, they should have a guaranteed 
place in the Legislature. 
B Electoral Rights 
Aside from claims of discrimination, separate Maori representation is also alleged to 
have a negative impact on the rights of other New Zealanders by threatening the integrity 
of our electoral system. Several submissions to the MMP Review Committee complained 
that while the seats may be effective at representing Maori, they undermined the 
democratic principle that every vote should be equal, and that in the long run they 
threatened the proportionality of the system with Maori votes carrying greater weight. 244 
242 Ken S Coates " International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous People~" in Ken S Coates and 
PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1998) 19, 29. 
243 Coates, above, 29. 
244 MMP Review Committee " Inquiry into the Review of MMP"(2001] AJHR I 23 A, 20. 
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Section 12 of the Bill of Rights states that every New Zealand citizen over the age of 
18 years can vote in elections for the House of Representatives, which elections shall be 
by equal suffrage.
245 
This is similar to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), whose obligations the Bill of Rights was aimed at 
incorporating into New Zealand domestic law.246 Article 25 of the ICCPR states that: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 [race, colour, sex, language, religion , political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status] and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives 
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the electors; 
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country 
The Human Rights Committee has noted that although the ICCPR does not impose 
any particular electoral system, the principle of "one person, one vote" must apply and the 
vote of one elector must be equal to the vote of another. The Committee rejects the 
drawing of electoral boundaries and methods of allocating votes that distort the 
distribution of voters or discriminate against any group.247 
It could be argued that the Maori seats are inconsistent with equal suffrage because not 
everyone has the option of voting for them, but Maori can choose whether to register on 
the Maori or General roll. As such, Maori could appear to have more voting power than 
other groups. 
The Justice and Law Reform Committee considered that the use of the term "equal 
suffrage" was unlikely to require a certain electoral system, such as MMP, to be 
established. 248 Similarly, it cannot require the seats be abolished. The Maori seats leave 
245 Emphasis added. 
246 See the long title of the Act - "An Act - (a) To affirm, protect and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; and (b) to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". 
247 Human Rights Committee CCPR General Comment 25: The Right to Participute in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art 25) ( 12/07/96). Adopted by the 
Committee at its I 5 I 0th meeting (fifty-seventh session) on 12 July 1996. 
248 Justice and Law Reform Committee " Interim Report of the Inquiry into the White Paper - A Bill of 
Rights for New Zealand" [1986) AJHR l-8A, 42. This is in line with the General Comments on Article 25 
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the principle of "one person, one vo~e" intact. Maori do not get any more votes than 
anyone else. Moreover, nobody can vote for any seat they like. To vote in any electoral 
district there are certain requirements, such as residency. Yet nobody would claim this is 
contrary to the idea of equal suffrage. 
Equality does not necessarily require the same treatment; in fact sometimes it requires 
different treatment to ensure that all groups can effectively enjoy the same rights. In 1867 
when the seats were introduced it was recognised that special Maori representation was 
needed to ensure Maori really did receive rights of equal suffrage.249 Since the Maori 
option was revised so that the number of Maori seats now reflects the number on the 
Maori roll, there has been a large increase in Maori registration.250 The Maori seats are 
an important way of ensuring that Maori do exercise their democratic rights and that their 
suffrage has real meaning. 
Another facet to this argument against the seats is that the Maori vote is worth more, 
as the average number of voters in the Maori electoral districts is slightly lower than for 
general districts. 251 However, the White Paper states:252 
"equal suffrage" does not require an exact equality of population for electorates. The present I 0 
percent differentiation allowed under the Electoral Acts 17 (itself a " reserved provision") is 
of the ICCPR: Human Rights Committee CCPR General Comment 25: The Right to Participate in Public 
Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art 25) ( 12/07/96), adopted by the 
Committee at its 1510th meeting (fifty-seventh session) on 12 July 1996. And it is also consistent with the 
European Commission of Human Rights decision of The Liberal Party v United Kingdom [ 1980] 4 EHRR 
I 06 where even though a first past the post electoral system in Britain did not adequately represent 
minorities, there was no breach of Articles 3 and 14 of the European Human Rights Convention 
guaranteeing the free expression of opinion of the people in the choice of a legislature and freedom from 
discrimination. It is worth noting that there was no requirement of equality in the secret ballot. 
249 See the preamble to the Maori Representation Act 1867. 
250 In the 1997 option 10 517 new Maori enrolments were on the Maori roll, and only 2 664 were on the 
General roll, allowing the number of seats to increase from four to five. MMP Review Committee" Inquiry 
into the Review of MMP" [2001] AJHR I 23 A, 22. At the 200 I electoral option 14 OOO Maori voters 
moved from the General roll to the Maori roll, and over 15 OOO of the 18 500 Maori registering for the first 
time signed on to the Maori roll. This allowed the number of Maori seats to increase to seven: 
"Parliament's Maori Seat anachronism" (24 January 2003) The Dominion Post Wellington, 4. 
25 1 The average for Maori districts is 53 099 people, whereas for the South Island and North Island General 
districts it is 54 308 and 54 296 people respectively. See Statistics ew Zealand Media Release Electoral 
Populations Calculated 
<http://www.stats.govt.nzldomino/extcrnal/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/web/ Media+ Release+Electoral+ Populations+ 
Calculated+200 I + Media+Release?open> (last accessed 18 July 2003). 
252 "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" [1984] 1 AJHR A6, 78 (emphasis added). 
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already one of the narrowest in Wes,ern democracies. Only if the permitted discrepancies in the 
populations of electorates were gross might a court hold that this Article had been infringed. 
Clearly the approximate 2.2 per cent difference in average population between the Maori 
and General electorates does not come anywhere near a "gross discrepancy" constituting 
unequal suffrage. 
C Justified Limitations 
Even if, contrary to the foregoing arguments, the seats do infringe either the right to 
freedom from discrimination or electoral rights of non-Maori, the seats may still be 
justified under the Bill of Rights. Rights do not exist in a vacuum, and it is necessary to 
place some limits on them.253 Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states 
that: 
subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights 
may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law in a free and democratic society. 
Even prima facie discrimination may not actually be a breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act. 
1 Is a section 5 analysis appropriate? 
In Quilter Thomas J stated that a section 5 analysis was inappropriate for 
discriminatory provisions as discrimination can never be reconciled with democratic ideal 
of equality before the law:254 
By its very nature discrimination on any of the grounds specified in section 21 cannot be open to 
justification in a free and democratic society. . . . Discrimination in all its forms is odious. It is 
hurtful to those discriminated against and harmful to the health of the body politic. As such, it is or 
should be repugnant in a free and democratic society. There are, in other words, no "reasonable 
limits" prescribed by law which could be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Discrimination and democracy are inherently antithetical. 
253 Justice and Law Reform Committee "Interim Repori of the Inquiry into the White Paper -A Bill of 
R.ights for New Zealand" [1986] AJI-IR l-8A, 26. 
254 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] I NZLR 523, 540 (CA). 
53 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
However, this prohibition on the use of section 5 is only workable if a high test of 
what constitutes discrimination is adopted. The other judges decided the case on the basis 
that the Marriage Act was inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and so must be applied. 
This meant that they did not have to determine whether it was discriminatory, nor whether 
it was justified. Nevertheless, Tipping J clearly contemplated that section 5 could be 
applied to discrimination. He states that not all discrimination is unlawful and a balancing 
act is required. The purpose of anti-discrimination legislation is:255 
to give substance to the principle of equality under the law and the law's unwillingness to allow 
discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds unless the reason for the discrimination serves a 
higher goal than the goal which anti-discrimination laws are designed to achieve. 
Even accepting that section 5 can be applied to discrimination, another issue regarding 
the relationship between sections 4 and 5 arises. In Ministry of Transport v Noort the 
Court of Appeal was divided in this regard. 256 Cooke P and Gault J considered that 
section 5 had no application once the provision was found to be inconsistent with the Bill 
of Rights. Section 5 is subject to section 4 which states that the Courts cannot refuse to 
enforce a provision, or hold it to be invalid, revoked or ineffective, simply because it is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
Applying this to the Maori seats, the Electoral Act 1993 is clear that non-Maori cannot 
vote for those seats, and special Maori representation must be enforced, even if it were 
found to be discriminatory or contrary to electoral rights. 257 There is no room for an 
1 . . . d . 6 258 a ternat1ve mterpretahon un er sect10n . 
On the other hand, the remaining judges in Noor!, Richardson, Hardie Boys and 
McKay JJ, thought it was necessary to first have regard to section 5 before finding a 
breach of the Bill of Rights. This view is preferable. The Court of Appeal in Moonen v 
255 Quilter, above, 573. 
256 [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
257 This was the approach taken in Re Benne// ( 1993) 2 HRNZ 358 (I IC) where Grieg J decided that the 
Electoral Act must prevail over the Bill of Rights section 12. The Electoral Act \"as clear that those 
detained in penal institutions pursuant to a conviction cannot vote, despite the Bill of Rights allowing all 
citizens over 18 the right to do so. 
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Film & Literature Board of Review259 suggested in obiter dicta that section 5 may require 
the Courts to make a declaration indicating that, although the provision must be upheld 
and enforced according to section 4, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and cannot be 
justified in a free and de~ocratic society.260 Thus it is still necessary to consider section 
5 limitations, despite the clear inconsistency with the Electoral Act provisions. 
2 The section 5 test 
The Court of Appeal in Moonen developed guidelines for assessmg whether a 
limitation on rights is justified in a free and democratic society according to section 5:
261 
• Identify the objective that the Legislature was trying to achieve through the statutory 
prov1s10n 
• Assess the importance and significance of that objective 
• Assess whether the importance of the objective is proportionate to the way it has been 
achieved 
• Assess whether there is a rational link between the means used and the objective so 
that there is as little interference as possible with the right 
• Assess whether the limitation is justifiable in light of the objective. 
In applying this test, the Court must consider all the issues which may have a bearing 
on the individual case. This may include social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, 
ethical or other concerns.262 
In R v Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada set out some of the core principles in a 
free and democratic society. Pertinent to the Maori seats, these included commitment to 
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide range of beliefs, respect for cultural 
258 Section 6 states that where an interpretation consistent with the ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is 
properly available, that interpretation must be preferred. 
259 (1999) 5 HRNZ 224 (CA) Tipping J. 
260 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review ( 1999) 5 HRNZ 224, 234 (CA) Tipping J. Some 
commentators have approved this. See Andrew Butler" Judicial Indications of Inconsistency - A New 
Weapon in the Bill of Rights Am1oury?" [2000] NZ Law Rev 43. 
261 Moonen, above, 233 - 234. 
262 Moonen, above, 234. 
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and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the 
participation of individuals and groups in society.263 
3 Application of the test to the Maori seats 
(a) Importance of the objective 
Put simply, the seats are a way of guaranteeing a Maori presence in the Legislature, 
and of ensuring Maori access to, and participation in, the legislative process. This is 
important for a number of reasons. Parliamentary representation enables Maori to take 
part in shaping the policies and legislation that will affect them. This helps protect their 
resources and helps to address the social and economic disadvantage Maori suffer. The 
goal of improving the quality of life for Maori, and trying to raise it to the same level as 
that enjoyed by non-Maori is undeniably important. There should not be such disparities 
on racial lines. 
But why guaranteed representation? Surely representation for any group, 
disadvantaged or not, is an important goal? Yet we do not require separate seats for 
Pacific Islanders, or women, despite the undeniable importance of their concerns. This is 
seen as the responsibility of political parties themselves and not a suitable subject for 
. I 264 specia measures. 
As discussed earlier, the importance of guaranteed representation comes from the 
Treaty,265 and also perhaps from the status of Maori as the indigenous people of New 
263 R v Oakes ( 1986) 26 DLR ( 4th) 200, 225 per Dickson CJC (Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ 
concurring). 
264 MMP Review Committee " Inqui ry into the Review of MMP"[2001] AJHR I 23 A, 43 and 45. The Royal 
Commission noted that providing separate representation for ethnic minorities, in particular Pacific Island 
communities, there would be great difficulties as they come from such diverse societies and form small 
percentages of the population. 
265 This was seen as an important reason for clause 12.4 of the Local Government Bi 11 200 I, which enabled 
Maori wards or constituencies to be created under the Local Electoral Act 2001. See Ministry of Justice 
Prelimina,y Legal Advice: Compliance with 1he New Zealand Bill of Rights Ac! 1990: The Local 
Government Bill 2001 (5 December 200 I) para 62, confirmed in Ministry of Justice legal Advice: 
Compliance wilh the New Zealand Bill of Rights Ac! 1990: The Local Government Bill 2001 (17 December 
2001) para 3. 
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Zealand. It is important in any socif'ty for promises made to be honoured, and not just 
when it suits the majority. Part of the justification for New Zealand colonisation, and thus 
for our society being here today, comes from the Treaty. If Maori and Pakeha are really to 
be meaningful partners and build one nation together, there must be an even playing field. 
It is important that Maori have a place in Parliament where they can exercise some 
rangatiratanga, protect their taonga, and truly enjoy the rights of "British citizens". 
(b) A rational and proportionate measure? 
The seats are rational because they have the desired effect of guaranteeing a of Maori 
presence in the House, and more importantly, of ensuring effective representation. As 
discussed above, now that MMP has been implemented, many of the disadvantages of the 
seats under FPP have been minimised, while the advantages have remained. The list 
seats mean that non-Maori MPs can no longer afford to ignore Maori concerns. The seats 
allow Maori to choose appropriate representatives for themselves. Other options for 
representing Maori views in Parliament do not give the same benefits, but would suffer 
the same disadvantages. 
Furthermore, the seats are achieving these goals with the least interference with the 
rights of non-Maori. While relying on MMP alone, for example, would interfere less, it 
would not offer Maori suitable representation. At the other end, a separate Parliament 
would offer Maori a high level of representation, but would interfere more with the rights 
of others, as rather than only a few seats, there would be a whole federal government or 
national Maori Parliament in which they could not participate. The existing seats sit 
comfo1iably in the middle and are a proportionate measure. 
Even if the seats did breach the right of non-Maori to freedom from discrimination, or 
infringe on their right to equal suffrage, guaranteed representation for Maori is a justified 
limitation on those rights in a free and democratic nation, such as New Zealand. 
VII CONCLUSION 
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The Maori seats in Parliament have a long history. They were instituted in 1867 as a 
temporary measure to lessen the effect on Maori of the proprietary requirements for 
suffrage. They were also considered something of a pacifier, and were ideologically 
linked to the demands of the miners who also received special representation. While these 
justifications are no longer applicable, the seats still exist, and should remain. 
The contention surrounding the seats is not aimed at Maori representation per se, but 
that it takes the form of guaranteed seats in Parliament, unavailable to any other group. 
Two reasons justify the special treatment. 
First, Maori status as the indigenous people of New Zealand differentiates them from 
other groups, as is being increasingly recognised at international law. While the Draft 
Declaration does not give enforceable rights as yet, its demand for full participation in 
decision-making at all levels is part of the wider context to be considered. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Maori have a unique relationship with the Crown as 
a Treaty partner. This requires active protection of Maori rights, including the right to 
political representation. Any just partnership should allow both partners to have a stake in 
the decision making. 
The Treaty also made certain promises to Maori , which must be honoured. While 
sovereignty resides in Parliament, Maori retained a lesser form of rangatiratanga. By 
guaranteeing Maori representation in Parliament, Maori have direct input into legislation 
and policy, and retain some control over their destiny. This also enables Maori to protect 
their taonga, and to enjoy the rights of British citizens promised to them. The Crown has 
vigorously enforced the concessions of sovereignty and pre-emption; Maori should at least 
be able to enjoy their part of the bargain too. 
Maori are different from other groups and deserve special political representation 
measures that others do not, but this must be more than empty symbolism. ln order to 
embody rangatiratanga, or enable Maori to protect their taonga, the seats must provide 
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effective representation. Although the Royal Commission did not favour the seats, the 
change to MMP allayed much of their concerns and ensured quality representation. With 
the creation of list seats no party can afford to ignore Maori, who make up 12% of the 
voting population. The s·eats offer Maori a means of promoting and protecting Maori 
views that is not possible with either the list or general electorate seats, where prominence 
must be given to the views of the non-Maori majority. 
Nor would alternative methods of Maori representation m Parliament give Maori 
direct representation. Instead, these rely too greatly on the goodwill of political parties to 
put forward appropriate spokespeople for Maori. While some alternatives better express 
rangatiratanga and partnership, there are many issues to work through before they can be 
implemented, and this will not happen in the near future. In the meantime we should 
focus on what we already have available, and what is already working - the Maori seats. 
Although the seats obviously treat Maori differently from other groups in society, this 
does not have a detrimental impact on the rights of other New Zealanders, and the seats 
are justified under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Arguably the seats do not 
constitute even a prima facie breach. They Jack the necessary unfairness to non-Maori to 
warrant the label discrimination. In any case they could be classified as a positive 
discrimination measure, although this does not give proper recognition to the special 
status of Maori as tangata whenua and Treaty partner, or the ongomg nature of that 
relationship. Nor do the Maori seats undermine our democracy. Just because Maori can 
choose which roll to vote on does not limit the voting rights of anyone else. It is still "one 
person one vote"; Maori votes do not carry more weight than anyone else's. 
Even if the seats constituted discrimination or infringement of electoral rights, this 
would be justified under section 5. Fulfilling Treaty obligations is an important objective, 
and effective representation via the seats is a rational and proportionate way of realising 
this. 
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While the justifications for their existence may have changed since 1867, there are still 
good reasons why the seats should remain today. They are an important and effective 
realisation of Maori Treaty rights, and a justified part of a free and democratic society. 
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